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Résumé / Abstract
Westudy a longitudinal sample of over one million French workers and over 500,000
employing firms. Real total annual compensation per worker is decomposed into components
related to observable characteristics, worker heterogeneity, firm heterogeneity and residual
variation. Except for the residual, all components may be correlated in an arbitrary fashion.
At the level of the individual, we find that person-effects, especially those not related to
observables like education, are a very important source of wage variation in France.
Firm-effects, while important, are not as important as person-effects. At the level of firms, we
find that enterprises that hire high-wage workers are more productive but not more
profitable. They are also more capital and high-skilled employee intensive. Enterprises that
pay higher wages, controlling for person-effects, are more productive and more profitable.
They are also more capital intensive but are not more high-skilled labor intensive. We also
find that person-effects explain 97% of inter-industry wage differentials.
Nous étudions un échantillon de données longitudinales sur plus de un million de
travailleurs français à lemploi de plus de 500 000 entreprises. La rémunération annuelle totale
par travailleur, en chiffres réels, est divisée en composantes reliées aux caractéristiques
observables, à lhétérogénéité des travailleurs, à lhétérogénéité des entreprises et à la variation
résiduelle. À lexception du résidu, toutes les composantes peuvent être corrélées de façon
arbitraire. Sur le plan des travailleurs, nous trouvons que les effets individuels, notamment les
effets reliés à des caractéristiques observables comme le niveau détudes, sont une source très
importante de dispersion des salaires en France. Les effets propres à lentreprise, même sils sont
importants, ne sont pas aussi importants que les effets individuels. Sur le plan des entreprises,
nous trouvons que les entreprises qui embauchent des travailleurs à salaire élevé sont plus
productives mais non plus rentables. Elles se caractérisent également comme des entreprises à
forte intensité de capital et en travailleurs hautement qualifiés. Les entreprises qui paient des
salaires plus élevés, compte tenu des effets individuels, sont plus productives et plus rentables.
Elles ont aussi une plus forte intensité en capital, mais nutilisent pas proportionnellement plus
de travailleurs hautement qualifiés. Nous trouvons enfin que les effets individuels expliquent
97 pour cent des différences de salaires entre industries.
1 Introduction
For several decades labor economists have lamented the lack of microeconomic
data relating characteristics of rms to characteristics of their workers (see, for
example, Rosen (1986) and Willis (1986)) because such data would permit re-
searchers to begin to disentangle the eects of rm-level human resource policies
from the eects of external choices made by individual workers. Why do high-
compensation rms pay more than the apparent going wage? Perhaps such a
strategy delivers a gain in productivity or protability that exceeds the incre-
mental wage cost, as predicted by eciency wage and agency models.
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Perhaps
high-paying rms select workers with higher external wage rates, thus sorting
the workers into rms that have dierential observed compensation programs.
2
Although broadly representative linked surveys of rms and workers are not
available in the U.S., there have now been numerous studies that attempt to
relate rm performance to the design of the compensation system. In this paper
we present the rst extensive statistical analysis of the individual and rm het-
erogeneity in compensation determination. We examine variation in personal
wage rates holding rm-eects constant and variation in rm wage rates holding
personal eects constant. Due to the longitudinal nature of our data, we are
able to control for both measured and unmeasured heterogeneity in the workers
and their employing rms.
A high-wage worker is a person with total compensation higher than ex-
pected on the basis of observable characteristics like labor force experience,
education, region, or sex. A high-wage rm is an employer with compensation
higher than expected given these same observable characteristics. Until now
all empirical analyses of personal and rm heterogeneity in compensation out-
comes have relied upon data that were inadequate to identify separately the
individual-eect necessary to classify a worker as high-wage and the rm-eect
required to classify a rm as high-wage. Using a unique longitudinal data set
on rms and workers that is representative of private French employment, we
are able to estimate both components of compensation determination, allowing
for unrestricted correlation among them. In the estimated models, we nd that
individual-eects are statistically more important than rm-eects and that the
two are not strongly correlated; however, the economic interpretation of these
statements is complicated by the mobility patterns in the data. Although our
statistical model allows for the identication of both rm- and individual-eects,
we show that for many simple economic models, the structural heterogeneity
of the workers and employers is not identical to the statistical heterogeneity
1
See Lazear (1979), Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), Hart and Holmstrom (1987) and Sapping-
ton (1991) for concise statements of the theories generating these predictions. Tests of these
models have been performed by Abowd (1990), Abowd and Kramarz (1993), Gibbons and
Murphy (1990, 1992) and Hutchens (1987).
2
This view is espoused by Bulow and Summers (1976), Cain (1976), Jovanovic (1979),
and Roy (1951). Some tests of these models include Dickens and Lang (1985), Flinn (1986),
Heckman and Sedlacek (1985).
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measured by our descriptive model.
We use the results of our individual-level data analysis to relate rm-level
outcomes and choices to the structure of the rm's compensation policy. Specif-
ically, we ask whether rms that hire high-wage workers are more protable
(no), more productive per worker (yes), more capital intensive (yes), more
professional-employment intensive (yes), more skilled labor intensive (no) and
more likely to survive (yes). Second, we ask whether high-wage rms are more
protable (yes), more productive per worker (yes), more capital intensive (yes),
more professional-employment intensive (no), more skilled labor intensive (no)
and more likely to survive (maybe). Finally, we aggregate our results to the
industry level, where we nd that high-wage workers and high-wage rms are
both explanations of the inter-industry wage dierential with high-wage workers
being much more important empirically.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our analysis data set.
Section 3 describes our methods for identifying and estimating the large number
of statistical eects that characterize worker and rm compensation heterogene-
ity and provides several potential economic interpretations of the descriptive
model's parameters. Section 4 describes our results. Section 5 concludes. A
Data Appendix describes our manipulation of the French data in great detail.
Finally, a Model Appendix gives details of the theoretical calculations.
2 Data Description and Sampling Plans
Our sample of workers comes from the Declarations Annuelles de Salaires (DAS),
an annual survey of employer-reported earnings subject to French social security
taxes. We follow approximately one million individuals over the years from 1976
to 1987. The sample is a 1/25th extract of the French work force, excluding gov-
ernment employees (but including employees of government-owned businesses).
Our compensation measure is the real total annual compensation cost for the
employee. This includes direct salary and all benet costs.
3
The data source
reports the number of days worked per year. Part time workers were excluded.
The total compensation measure for part year workers was annualized on a base
of 360 days per year. The data included the individual's age, sex, location of
job, occupation, and an identier for the employer. We supplemented these
data with information on the individual's education, available for ten percent
of the sample and imputed for the rest (see the Data Appendix). We followed
workers and employers across years and assigned a worker to the employer for
which he or she had the largest number of paid days in a given year. We refer
to the resulting analysis data le as the \individual data."
Our sample of rms comes from the annual survey Beneces Industriels
et Commerciaux (BIC), which collects a large amount of income statement,
3
Some components of employer compensation costs were estimated by the Revenus division
at INSEE.
2
balance sheet, employment and ow of funds information in support of the
French national accounts. We use a probability sample of 20,000 of these rms,
followed from 1978 to 1988, constructed by INSEE to facilitate research on
rms (INSEE, 1989, 1990a-1990c). Our measures of rm performance include
value added per employee, operating income as a proportion of total assets
and sales per employee. As measures of factor inputs we calculated total real
assets and total year-end employment. We added detailed measures of the
rm's employment structure (professional, skilled and unskilled) from the annual
Enque^te sur la Structure des Emplois (Survey of employment structure). We
refer to the resulting analysis data le as the \rm data."
The worker and rm samples are linked using an identication number
(SIREN) for the employer that corresponds to a business unit{one or more
establishments engaged in a related economic activity. Thus, our analysis of
rm-eects is at the level of an enterprise and not at the level of establishments.
We do not use the ownership structure of our rms. When the enterprises
change owners but remain in the same business, their SIRENs do not normally
change. Thus, we are able to follow the economic activity of our rms through
most nancial and ownership restructurations. We use the linked individual-
rm data to estimate the relation among various compensation policies and
rm-level economic variables.
3 A Statistical Model for Individual Compensa-
tion
The basic compensation equation for an individual is given by
y
it
= x
it
 + 
i
+  
J
(i;t)it
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it
(1)
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it
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is the linear spline basis function
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Finally, the error term "
it
is stochastically independent of all other eects in
equation (1) with
E
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] = 0 and Var["
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"
. The stochastic structure of x
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is unrestricted so that these eects may be cross-correlated. The
identication conditions imposed upon the model are
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3.1 Potential Interpretations of the Descriptive Model
We illustrate the relation between structural heterogeneity in the populations of
workers (heterogeneous abilities or tastes) and rms (heterogeneous eciencies
or technologies) and the statistical heterogeneity in equation (1) using three
economic models with very simple population structures. In each case we derive
the conditional expectation of individual compensation given the identity of
the employing rm and the individual. We then relate the parameters of this
conditional expectation to our statistical parameterization above.
3.1.1 A matching model with endogenous turnover
Suppose that workers are homogeneous. There are two types of rms, m and
n, and two periods. In type m rms a worker's marginal product and wage
rate are always w

, and employment is always available in a type m rm. In
type n rms there is a matching process. Worker i's productivity is w

+
"
in
in both periods with "
in
drawn from a binomial distribution B( H;H;
1
2
).
The matching outcome, "
in
, unknown to both the worker and the rm at the
beginning of the rst period of employment, is realized at the end of the rst
period and becomes public information. Workers are oered contracts at the
beginning of the rst period of the form (w
1
; w
2
) and workers may leave rm
n at the end of the rst period. All rms make zero prots. The equilibrium
contract for rms of type n is (w

 
H
2
; w

+ "
in
). All workers in type n rms
with a bad matching outcome ( H) quit to type m rms.
4
The use of a linear spline at 10 years of seniority is a specication that we found better
suited to these data than a quadratic. As will become evident below, three parameters at the
rm level is already quite exible and we did not nd much to be gained by adding addition
polynomial tems in seniority.
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To simplify the model, we consider a stationary situation with nine workers
who live for two periods each, three born in period 0, three born in period 1,
three born in period 2. Two workers in each generation enter type n rms, one
worker in each generation enters a type m rm. Of the two workers who entered
type n rms, let one draw a positive matching outcome and the other draw a
negative matching outcome. The worker with the negative matching outcome
leaves the type n rm for a type m rm when the matching parameter is made
public.
The structure of the data implied by this theoretical model is shown in
appendix Table B1. This corresponds to the following parameter values in our
descriptive model:
 = w

where  is the overall mean;

i
= 0; i = 1; :::; 9
where 
i
is person i person-eect;
(
m
; 
m
) = (0; 0)
for the type m rm compensation policy; and
(
n
; 
n
) = ( 
H
2
;
3H
2
)
for the type n rm compensation policy.
3.1.2 A rent-splitting model with exogenous turnover
Suppose there are four dierent individuals, two types of rms, m and n, and
two time periods. Each of the two rms earns quasi-rents of q
jt
, and the quasi-
rents are split by negotiation so that the workers receive a share s
j
of the
quasi-rent in rm j. Suppose that each rm employs two workers. With proba-
bility one, exactly one worker is randomly selected to separate from the period
one employer and be re-employed at the other rm in the second period. All
information about the workers and rms is known to those parties but not to
the statistician. All workers are included in the data sample and the typical
worker has wages of the form:
y
it
= x
i
+ s
j
q
jt
where x
j
is the measure of wage rate heterogeneity, i.e. the worker type, q
jt
follows a binomial distribution B( Q;Q;
1
2
), i = 1:::; 4, j = m;n, and t = 1; 2.
Table B2 shows the relation among the theoretical parameters, x
i
, s
j
, and Q,
and the statistical parameters of equation (1) for each worker and each period.
The model cannot be solved exactly. Thus, we use these relations to solve, by
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least squares, the moment equations that determine the relations between the
statistical parameters and the model parameters. This yields:
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are respectively the type m and type n rms' policies.
3.1.3 An incentive model with unobserved individual heterogeneity
Following Kramarz and Rey (1994), consider workers who are heterogeneous
with respect to a parameter q 2 [0; 1], which is known to them but not known
to the rms. Suppose, furthermore, that there are two types of rms, m and n,
that dier according to their technology, and that there are two time periods. At
type m rms, workers are hired for one period and have a level of productivity
y

regardless of their q. At type n rms, workers are hired in period one,
produce y regardless of their q, and choose an eort level, either 0 or E, to exert
during on-the-job training. At the end of the rst period, workers in rm type
n take a formal, veriable test. If worker q exerts eort E, the test is passed
with probability q. Otherwise, the test is passed with probability kq, where
(0 < k < 1). At the beginning of the second period, the rm decides which
workers to keep and the workers may leave on their own. Workers who exert
6
eort E have a level of productivity in the second period of y+
q
if they remain
in a type n rm.
There are many type m rms and two type n rms, which compete for
workers in both periods. Workers in type m rms always receive a wage w

.
Workers in type n rms are oered a wage contract (w
1
(q); w
2
(q); b(q)), where
w
1
(q) is the rst period wage, w
2
(q) is the second period wage, and b(q) is the
bonus paid to those who pass the test. In equilibrium all rms of both types
make zero prots because of the competition to attract workers. Furthermore,
if y + (y + 
q
) is convex in q ( being the rate of discount of future earnings),
the equilibrium contract will be such that w
1
(q) = y   qb

(q), w
2
(q) = y + 
q
,
and
b(q) =
d
dq
(y + (y + 
q
))
All workers with type q, q  p, will choose to enter one of the type n rms and
will choose to exert eort E when b(p) 
E
(1 k)p
.
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To simplify the model, we suppose that 
q
= 
q
2
2
and that parameters are
such that p =
1
3
. We also suppose that there are nine workers, three of whom
are employed by type m rms and the remaining six work in type n rms.
Appendix Table B3 shows the wage of every individual in each rm and in
each period in terms of the theoretical model, as well as in terms of the descrip-
tive model. These equations can be solved in order to express each parameter of
the descriptive model using parameters of the theoretical model. As in the rent-
splitting model, the solution is not exact{we must use least squares to express
the function of the theoretical parameters that is closest to the statistical pa-
rameter. To see why, consider the workers in type n rms. Individual 7 passed
the test and, consequently, received a bonus. This result generates a seniority
slope for individual 7. Individual 8 did not pass the test and therefore received
no bonus in period 2. Thus individual 8 has a dierent seniority slope in the
same rm. The statistical parameter 
n
measures the average seniority slope
in the rm n. Thus, the resulting estimated seniority slope will be the least
squares estimate of the average of the two slopes. We illustrate these solutions
for all the statistical parameters below.
The overall mean, , is given by the following:
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Proofs of all these assertions can be found in Kramarz and Rey (1994).
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and those for individual i = 8; 9 are:
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where k = 8; 9, i 6= k. Finally, the individual eects for i = 1; 2; 3 and the
rm eects for m are not separately identiable, since there are no movements
between rms. We arbitrarily set:

i
= 0; i = 1; 2; 3
for these individuals, implying a rm eect of:
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The seniority slopes are:
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= 0
for rm m and
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rm n.
Notice that the 
i
of the workers in the type n rm depend upon their hidden
characteristics q
i
as well as the characteristics of their fellow workers. Note also
that the intercept in type m rms is larger than that of type n rms. Finally,
as mentioned above, the seniority slope, 
n
, in type n rms is the least squares
average of the career paths in the rm, depending on the success or failure of
the test.
Although we do not attempt to recover the parameters of any particular
theoretical model from the estimates produced below, we will use the simple
theoretical frameworks outlined in this subsection to comment upon the results.
No single economic model is likely to explain a large, diverse labor market like
the one we study. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that it is not
always possible to make a direct interpretation of the statistical parameters (for
individual or rm) in terms of simple economic parameters. In general, the
interpretation of a given statistical parameter depends upon all the elements of
the economic model under consideration.
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3.2 Computation and Identication in the Statistical Model
In the context of equation (1), our goal is to estimate the invariant parame-
ters  and  consistently in the presence of individual- and rm-eects that
may be correlated with the person-specic characteristics. Next, we want to
estimate 
i
and  
J
(i;t)it
in a manner that allows us to use these estimates,
when averaged within a rm j, as potential explanatory variables for dier-
ences in rm productivity, protability, factor utilization and survival. The
computational problem we face is that the least squares design matrix implied
by equations (2) and (3) is enormous and cannot be simplied using any of
the standard techniques in linear models (as, for example, in Schee, 1959).
There are over one million individuals and 500,000 rms (of which 14,000 have
at least 10 individual-year observations) represented in our data. Thus, elim-
inating the individual-eects from (1) by deviations from person-means leaves
a high dimension, non-sparse, non-patterned least squares equation system to
solve for the time-invariant and rm-specic parameters. Similarly, eliminating
the rm-eects by deviations from rm-means (conditional on seniority) leaves
an equally complex least squares equation system to solve. Finally, adopting
Chamberlain's (1984) method of projecting the individual- and rm-eects onto
a set of person and rm characteristics, while permitting consistent estimation
of  and , complicates our second goal by forcing us to model the rm-level
eects of compensation policies directly in (1).
We adopt a variant of Chamberlain's method with a simplication rst pro-
posed by Mundlak (1978). In our projection method we project the rm-eect
onto a vector of rm and person characteristics constructed so as to allow the
desired correlation among the individual-eects, observable individual charac-
teristics and the rm-eects. This permits consistent estimation of  and least
squares estimation of 
i
. The resulting estimates are then used to produce
consistent estimates of the rm-eects and of the rm-level averages of the
individual-eects, which we use in our rm-level analysis.
It is worth discussing why we rejected two potential computational simplications{
sampling individuals and sampling rms{thus reducing the dimensionality of the
person- and rm-eects to make the problem tractable. The person eects are
typically identied by repeated observations on the same individual and the rm
eects are typically identied by multiple employees in the same rm. When
both types of eect are present in the same model, rm-eects are identied
by the presence in the sample of individuals observed for multiple years and
in multiple rms that employ other members of the sample. Without some
movement of the individuals among the rms, neither rm- nor person-eects
are separately identiable. However, a relatively small amount of mobility suf-
ces to identify many rm- and person-eects. The identication of the person
and rm eects for individuals with at least two observations occurs whenever
these individuals work at least once in a rm that has at some point employed
a person who changed employers. When sampling individuals, as the size of the
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sample increases, the representativeness of the estimated rm-eects improves
because in small samples of individuals the identied rm-eects are mostly
from large rms, whereas in larger samples the additional individuals increase
the probability that there will be a mover among the smaller rms. Further-
more, reducing the size of the individual sample would have prevented us from
estimating rm-specic seniority returns because there are fewer and fewer rms
with adequate sample sizes as the sample of individuals is reduced. On the other
hand, when sampling rms we can estimate only selected rm-eects using all
the available individual observations, assuming that the rm-eects from the
nonsampled rms are zero. To obtain a representative, reasonably large set
of rm-eect estimates, this procedure would have to be repeated many times
(approximately 1,000 times to reproduce the rm-eects we have estimated by
our preferred method). It is not obvious that this procedure oers any compu-
tational advantages.
Regardless of the computational approach used, between-employer mobil-
ity of the individuals is essential for the identication of our statistical model.
Table 1 examines the pattern of inter-employer movements among all sample
individuals. The rows of Table 1 correspond to the number of years a person is
in the sample. The columns, with the exception of column (1a), correspond to
the number of employers the individual had. An individual contributes to only
one cell (again, excepting column (1a)). Notice that 59.4% of the individuals in
the sample never change employers (column (1)).
6
Approximately one-fth of
the single employer individuals worked in rms with no movers while four-fths
(47.9% of the overall sample, column (1a)) worked in rms that, at one time or
another, employed a person who changed employer. Thus, 88.5% of the sample
individuals contribute to the estimation of rm-eects. It is also interesting to
notice the pattern of employer spells among the movers (columns (2)-(10)). The
second line of each cell shows the most frequent conguration of employer spells
for individuals in that cell. In almost every case, short spells precede longer
spells, indicating that mobility is greater in the early career (as Topel and Ward
(1992) found for American men). It seems clear from Table 1 that the data
should allow us to separate the individual-eect from the rm-eect.
3.3 A Projection Method for Estimating Correlated Ef-
fects
Our proposed method allows us to estimate the parameters  consistently in
the presence of both individual- and rm-eects without adopting a step-wise
approach that imposes orthogonality among the dierent eects. We project
6
Notice that the cell (1,1) contains 318,627 individuals who appear in the sample during
a single year. Some of these individuals may represent coding errors in the person identier;
however, it is not possible to correct these errors.
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the rm-eect onto the rm and individual data according to the equation:
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Estimates of the individual e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We note that although the least squares estimate of the individual eect
b
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i
is
not consistent as N ! 1, this is not a problem when we estimate rm-level
models because the rm-average of
b
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can be consistently estimated.
Next consider the estimation of the rm eects 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To recover the 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Similarly, the rm-level average education eect is given by
u
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with asymptotic distribution based upon (22).
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In all our asymptotic results we hold constant the distribution of rm sizes. Thus as
N;N
j
!1;we assume that their ratio goes to a non-zero constant.
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3.4 Analysis of Firm-level Outcomes
We consider next the statistical relation between rm-level outcomes and our
measures of rm-level compensation policy. Our basic model is
p
j
=
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u
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 
j
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q
j





+ 
j
(29)
where j = 1; :::J , the total number of rms in the rm sample, p
j
is any rm-
level outcome,

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
is a vector of rm-level compensa-
tion measures,  is a vector of parameters of interest, q
j
is a vector of other
rm-level variables,  is a vector of associated parameters and 
j
is a zero-mean
homoscedastic statistical error. In the regression analysis, rm-level outcomes
and rm-level compensation variables were measured using data from two in-
dependently drawn samples. However, the rm-level compensation variables
derived from our individual sample are estimated regressors. Consequently, we
must allow for the estimation errors in b
j
; u
j
b;
b

j
; b
1j
and b
2j
in our assess-
ment of the precision of the estimation of rm-level equations.
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In order to derive the error covariance matrix for equation (30),
let
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Now, equation (30) can be re-expressed in a rst order approximation around
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as:
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The rm-level regressor x
j
b
 also contains some measurement error, in principle; however,
the vector
b
 is estimated with such precision that we do not carry along its estimated co-
variance matrix (including its estimated covariance with b
j
; u
j
b;
b

j
; b
1j
and b
2j
) in these
calculations. Hence, we place x
j
b
 in the list of q
j
.
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We adopt the model of Pagan (1984) and Murphy and Topel (1985); namely, that the
regression of interest relates a function of the individual-level data and several rm-level
parameters to the other measured rm-level outcomes. We account for the estimation error
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explicitly, but we do not
add an additional measurement error. Thus, for example, we assert that the outcome p
j
depends upon 
j
and not upon 
j
+ 
j
, where 
j
is an independent measurement error.
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The variance of the regression error term for equation (31) consists of the com-
ponent due to the estimation error in
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where the components of Var
h
b

j
i
are dened in the derivations above. We
estimate equation (31) using generalized least squares based upon the error
variance in equation (32).
4 Estimation Results
Table 2 shows the basic summary statistics, by sex, for the individual-level
data. The usable sample consists of 3,434,530 observations on 711,518 men and
1,870,578 usable observations on 454,787 women. The basic individual-level
variables consist of labor force experience, region of France, education level
and seniority. Note that about 30% of the sample has no known educational
attainment. For 74% of the individuals, there are enough observations in the
sample to permit estimation of a distinct rm-eect.
10
Recall from Table 1 that
some 27% of our individuals appear in only one of the 10 data years while 10.6%
are present for all 10 years. More than 59% of the individuals have only a single
employer while 2, 3 and 4 employers account for 21.8%, 10.7%, and 4.8% of the
individuals, respectively.
The results of our projection method for estimating the basic regression
parameters are shown in Table 3, separately for men and women. These es-
timates are the results of applying the multiple step procedure presented in
section 3. The results shown in the columns "Projection Method," thus, come
from two separate regression models{the one shown in equation (2), for the ed-
ucation coecients, and the one shown in equation (9), for the time-varying
individual characteristics.
11
For comparison purposes, Table 3 also shows the
ordinary least squares results, the within estimates for xed person-eects and
the within estimates for xed rm-eects. Evidently, the projection method re-
sults are much closer to the within-person estimates than to those within rms
whereas the least squares results are closer to the within-rm estimates.
10
The individuals from rms with fewer than 10 observations in the sample were pooled
and a single rm-level regression was used to estimate their rm-eects.
11
The remaining coecients from equation (9) can be found in the Data Appendix. The
seniority coecients shown for the projection method are the individual averages of b
1j
and
b
2j
from Table 4.
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Table 4 contains descriptive statistics for the components of real compensa-
tion implied by the estimated parameters from equation (1) separately for each
sex. For both males and females, the standard deviation of the individual-eect,
and its components and u, is much larger than that of the rm-eect, and its
components , 
1
and 
2
. As noted in Table 3, the complete parameterization
in explains 80% of the variation in real salaries for men and 75% for women;
thus, the idiosyncratic component of variance is still rather important.
Table 5 shows the intercorrelations of the components of compensation. All
components of compensation except the residual account for 81% of the vari-
ance of real total annual compensation costs (combined result for males and
females). Furthermore, the 
i
component of the individual-eect (the part not
explained by education) is more important than the observable regressors (x)
in explaining compensation costs. The overall rm eect,  
j
, on the other
hand, is only about one-quarter as important as the overall person-eect. The
individual-eect and the rm-eect are correlated 0.10 according to our results.
The  and  components are correlated 0.08 according to this method. Notice
that although the rm-specic intercept, , and the -component of the indi-
vidual eect are positively correlated, the rm-specic intercept is negatively
correlated with the seniority slope (-0.56).
One may get the impression from Table5 that the individual-eects and
rm-eects are not highly correlated. Table 6 shows that this is not completely
correct. In this table we begin to address the problem of inter-employer mobility
in our sample. If the mobility in the economy is exogenous; that is, if the
probability of separation from one rm and accession into another does not
depend upon the individual's wage path, then the association of the parameter

j
with the pay practices of rm j is correct. Otherwise, the movers and stayers
systematically sort according to their values of , , and ". In this second
case, measured values of rm-eects are contaminated by the average values of
individual-eects of the movers relative to the stayers, as can be seen in the two
endogenous mobility models discussed above.
For Table 6, the individuals were divided into three groups according to
their 's. High- workers are much more likely to be observed in a single
job (one employer) whereas low- workers are relatively more likely to have had
three or more employers. High- workers also have more labor-force experience.
Although  and  are positively correlated, low-workers are more likely to have
had multiple employers. In particular the low- low- low experience workers
are the most likely to have had multiple employers. Table 7 examines the
mobility of high- versus low- workers explicitly. Persons with low estimated
individual-eects are much more likely to move between low- jobs than are
persons with high individual-eects (57% versus 40%). Evidently the clean
distinction between individual heterogeneity and rm heterogeneity is called
into question by this pattern. Do we estimate low 's because the individual
has moved through a sequence of low- jobs or rather because some employers
are more likely to choose low- workers, who are more mobile for a variety of
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reasons? Our analysis does not provide a clear answer to this question.
Table 8 presents summary statistics for the sample of rms (weighted to be
representative of private industrial rms). Table 9 presents regression models
for the logarithm of real value added per employee, real sales per employee
(measures of productivity) and operating income as a proportion of total assets
(a measure of performance). Using the rm-level compensation policy measures
generated by our projection method, we note that a larger value of the predicted
wage (x-component) is associated with higher value-added and sales per worker
and higher protablity. A larger individual-eect (-component) is associated
with a substantially larger value-added per employee and sales per employee
but not with higher protability. The part of the individual-eect related to
education (u-component) is associated with higher value-added per worker
but is not signicant in the other two columns. Higher rm-specic wages (-
component) are associated with higher productivity (value-added per worker
and sales per worker) and with higher protability. Neither seniority slope is
associated with higher (or lower) productivity or protability.
Table 10 presents the results for the relations among our compensation mea-
sures and a variety of rm-level factor utilization rates. Larger values of the
x-component of compensation are associated with higher employment, cap-
ital, capital-labor ratio, professional employment proportion and skilled em-
ployment proportion. The -component of the individual-eect is positively
associated with total employment, total real capital, the capital-labor ratio and
the proportion of engineers, technical workers and managers in the work force,
and is negatively related to the shares of both skilled and unskilled workers.
Larger values of the average education eect are associated with higher total
employment, total real capital and professional proportion but lower values of
the skilled proportion. The rm-specic intercept (-component of the rm ef-
fect) is strongly positively associated with total employment, total real capital
and capital intensity but is not associated with any components of the skill
structure of the work force. Employment proportions are not related to this
component of the rm eect in compensation. A high rm-specic seniority
slope is positively associated with capital intensity and slightly associated with
the proportion of professional employees.
Table 11 presents a proportional hazards analysis of the relation between
the survival of rms and our estimated compensation components at the rm
level. Both components of the individual eect ( and the education part u)
increase survivorship in a statistically signicant manner. The eects related
to rm-specic compensation factors are large but very imprecise. The eect
associated with the x-component goes in the opposite direction.
Finally, Table 12 uses industry-level averages of the individual and rm spe-
cic components of compensation to explain the industry-eect found in our raw
individual data (regression adjusted for labor force experience, region, year, ed-
ucation and sex) in the spirit of Dickens and Katz (1987) and Krueger and
Summers (1988). Since the right-hand side variables in this regression fully ac-
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count for the industry eects in a statistical sense (R
2
= 0:97), the interesting
question is the relative importance of individual heterogeneity (-component of
the person eect) and rm heterogeneity (both  and -components) as com-
ponents of the industry eects. The third through sixth columns of Table 12
present separate industry-level regressions using rst  alone (column 3 and 4)
and then the three parts of the rm-eect by themselves (columns 5 and 6).
It is clear from the fact that  alone explains 92% of the inter-industry wage
variation, whereas the rm-specic components explain only 25%, that individ-
ual eects, as measured statistically are more important than rm-components.
One should recall, however, that in our example theoretical models structural
rm and individual heterogeneity can inuence both of the statistical measures.
5 Conclusions
In all likelihood, our analysis of the separate eects of individual and rm het-
erogeneity on wage rates and on rm compensation policies has raised more
new questions than it has resolved. We nd that individual-eects are a signi-
cant component of real total annual compensation variation. Firm-eects, while
also important, are not as important as individual-eects. Firm-level hetero-
geneity and individual-level heterogeneity are not highly correlated; however,
mobility patterns suggest that the distinction between an individual-eect and
a rm-eect is not economically simple. Firms that hire high-wage workers
appear to be more productive per worker but not more protable. High-wage
rms{those paying higher wages controlling for the individual heterogeneity of
the employees{are more productive per worker and are more protable. Both
sources of wage rate heterogeneity{high-wage workers and high-wage rms{are
associated with more capital intensive rms. We also estimated rm-level het-
erogeneity in the returns to seniority. This component of wage variation is decid-
edly less important in our sample than the two pure heterogeneity components.
We believe that our results provide the statistical basis upon which to begin
the process of testing the relevance of agency, eciency wage, search/matching,
and endogeneous mobility models as potential explanations for compensation
outcome heterogeneity.
18
19
Table 1
Structure of the Individual Data by Years in Sample and Number of Employers
(Number of Individuals, Most Common Configuration of Employers)
Years in Number of Employers
Sample 1 1a 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total Percent
1 318.627 247.532 318.627 27,3%
1 1
2 75.299 57.411 51.066 126.365 10,8%
2 2 11
3 46.385 36.540 32.947 19.583 98.915 8,5%
3 3 12 111
4 43.019 34.922 26.631 17.191 8.330 95.171 8,2%
4 4 13 112 1111
5 41.130 34.596 26.408 15.291 8.685 3.610 95.124 8,2%
5 5 14 113 1112 11111
6 29.755 25.388 20.953 13.734 7.592 4.073 1.653 77.760 6,7%
6 6 15 114 1113 11112 111111
7 19.413 16.709 17.384 12.039 7.305 3.864 1.931 735 62.671 5,4%
7 7 16 115 1114 11113 111112 1111111
8 23.484 20.378 20.421 13.185 7.673 4.001 2.061 917 327 72.069 6,2%
8 8 44 116 1115 11114 111113 1111112 11111111
9 38.505 34.147 26.350 15.791 8.590 4.383 2.104 938 362 114 97.137 8,3%
9 9 54 117 1116 11115 111114 1111113 11111112 111111111
10 56.881 51.425 32.616 17.728 8.369 3.839 1.837 739 314 109 34 122.466 10,5%
10* 10* 64 118 1117 11116 221113 1131112 11111113 111111112 1111111111
Total 692.498 559.048 254.776 124.542 56.544 23.770 9.586 3.329 1.003 223 34 1.166.305 100,0%
Percent 59,4% 47,9% 21,8% 10,7% 4,8% 2,0% 0,8% 0,3% 0,1% 0,0% 0,0% 100,0%
Source: DAS individual data.
Notes: Employment configurations are described in terms of the number of consecutive years spent with each of the individuals employers, in order (e.g. configuration 124 means that the
individual spent 1 year with his first employer, then 2 years with his second employer, and finally 4 years with his third employer). Column 1a refers tothe subset of individuals with only one
employer whose employing firm had at least one other individual who had changed firms at least once in his career (required for identification of both firm and individual effects).
* This configuration corresponds to 10 years of data with the first (and only) employer.
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for Basic Individual Level Variables by Sex for 1976 to 1987
Men Women
Variable Definition Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Log (Real Annual Compensation Cost, 1980 FF) 4.3442 0.5187 4.0984 0.4801
Total Labor Force Experience 17.2531 11.8258 15.4301 12.0089
(Total Labor Force Experience) /100 4.3752 4.9197 3.8230 4.94402
(Total Labor Force Experience) /1000 13.1530 19.4305 11.6079 19.68633
(Total Labor Force Experience) /10000 43.3453 77.9542 39.0589 80.32514
Seniority 7.7067 7.5510 6.5437 6.5268
Lives in Ile-de-France (Paris Metropolitan Region) 0.2561 0.2910
No Known Degree 0.3064 0.2190 0.2971 0.2124
Completed Elementary School 0.1556 0.1458 0.1893 0.1739
Completed Junior High School 0.0565 0.0792 0.0869 0.1008
Completed High School (Baccalauréat) 0.0528 0.0804 0.0711 0.0881
Basic Vocational-Technical Degree 0.2652 0.1849 0.1926 0.1545
Advanced Vocational-Technical Degree 0.0701 0.0893 0.0532 0.0802
Technical College or University Diploma 0.0469 0.0754 0.0838 0.1247
Graduate School Diploma 0.0465 0.0964 0.0259 0.0551
Year of data 81.3106 3.7250 81.4730 3.7180
Number of Observations for the Firm in Sample 4402.3800 16164.6200 1605.3100 7797.1300
Observations 3,434,530 1,870,578
Persons 711,518 454,787
Sufficient Data Available to Estimate Firm Effect 0.7425 0.7448
Notes: For sources and methods see the Data Appendix.
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Table 3
Estimates of the Effects of Labor Force Experience, Region and Year on the Log of Real Total Annual Compensation Costs Individual Data by Sex for 1976 to 1987
Variable
Projection Method Least Squares Within Persons Within Firms
Parameter Standard Parameter Standard Parameter Standard Parameter Standard
Estimate Error Estimate Error Estimate Error Estimate Error
Men
Total labor force experience 0,0729 (0,0004) 0,0522 (0,0003) 0,0675 (0,0004) 0,0434 (0,0003)
(LF experience squared)/100 -0,4509 (0,0027) -0,2189 (0,0030) -0,4435 (0,0029) -0,1518 (0,0027)
(LF experience cubed)/1000 0,1072 (0,0009) 0,0494 (0,0010) 0,1079 (0,0010) 0,0290 (0,0009)
(LF experience quartic)/10000 -0,0095 (0,0001) -0,0047 (0,0001) -0,0097 (0,0001) -0,0025 (0,0001)
Seniority -3,37e-05 (1,81e-05) 0,0143 (0,0001) 0,0049 (0,0001) 0,0094 (0,0001)
Seniority spline at 10 years -5,36e-04 (2,92e-05) -0,0048 (0,0002) -0,0034 (0,0001) -0,0030 (0,0001)
Lives in Ile-de-France 0,0800 (0,0010) 0,1400 (0,0005) 0,0820 (0,0011) 0,1116 (0,0007)
Year 1977 0,0203 (0,0007) 0,0379 (0,0010) 0,0275 (0,0008) 0,0202 (0,0009)
Year 1978 0,0531 (0,0008) 0,0692 (0,0010) 0,0640 (0,0009) 0,0489 (0,0009)
Year 1979 0,0782 (0,0009) 0,0895 (0,0010) 0,0922 (0,0010) 0,0629 (0,0009)
Year 1980 0,0914 (0,0010) 0,0957 (0,0010) 0,1076 (0,0011) 0,0678 (0,0009)
Year 1982 0,1289 (0,0014) 0,1200 (0,0011) 0,1497 (0,0005) 0,0846 (0,0009)
Year 1984 0,1723 (0,0018) 0,1505 (0,0011) 0,1973 (0,0018) 0,1045 (0,0009)
Year 1985 0,1966 (0,0020) 0,1727 (0,0011) 0,2235 (0,0020) 0,1182 (0,0009)
Year 1986 0,2304 (0,0021) 0,1906 (0,0011) 0,2592 (0,0022) 0,1349 (0,0009)
Year 1987 0,2517 (0,0023) 0,2020 (0,0011) 0,2825 (0,0024) 0,1433 (0,0009)
Elementary School Education 0,5778 (0,0036) 0,1138 (0,0020) a 0,0823 (0,0019)
Junior High School Education 0,1494 (0,0058) 0,4515 (0,0031) a 0,3662 (0,0029)
High School Graduate 0,4249 (0,0063) 0,6665 (0,0033) a 0,5375 (0,0030)
Basic Vocational-Technical Grad. -0,0704 (0,0028) 0,2454 (0,0016) a 0,2123 (0,0015)
Advanced Vocational-Technical Grad. 0,6136 (0,0051) 0,6325 (0,0027) a 0,5331 (0,0025)
Technical College or Undergrad. Degree 0,1359 (0,0065) 0,6113 (0,0035) a 0,4716 (0,0031)
Graduate School Degree 1,6032 (0,0051) 1,4392 (0,0028) a 1,2604 (0,0025)
Intercept 3,6899 (0,0016) 3,4244 (0,0014) a 0,0518 (0,0022)
Root mean square error 0,2684 0,4227 0,2685 0,3420 b
Error degrees of freedom 2.585.147 3.434.506 2.722.996 5.234.086 b
R-squared 0,7985 0,3358 0,7875 0,5715 b
Sample size 3.434.530 3.434.530 3.434.530 5.305.108 b
(cont.)
22
Table 3 (continued)
Estimates of the Effects of Labor Force Experience, Region and Year on the Log of Real Total Annual Compensation Costs Individual Data by Sex for 1976 to 1987
Variable
Projection Method Least Squares Within Persons Within Firms
Parameter Standard Parameter Standard Parameter Standard Parameter Standard
Estimate Error Estimate Error Estimate Error Estimate Error
Women
Total labor force experience 0,0334 (0,0005) 0,0299 (0,0004) 0,0268 (0,0006) 0,0210 (0,0004)
100 -0,1796 (0,0037) -0,0938 (0,0038) -0,1501 (0,0042) -0,0230 (0,0035)
1000 0,0396 (0,0013) 0,0144 (0,0013) 0,0326 (0,0015) -0,0072 (0,0012)
10000 -0,0032 (0,0001) -0,0010 (0,0001) -0,0026 (0,0002) 0,0012 (0,0001)
Seniority 8,28e-04 (2,38e-05) 0,0172 (0,0001) 0,0055 (0,0001) 0,0116 (0,0001)
Seniority spline at 10 years -1,64e-03 (4,20e-05) -0,0069 (0,0002) -0,0074 (0,0002) -0,0031 (0,0002)
Lives in Ile-de-France 0,0782 (0,0016) 0,1577 (0,0007) 0,0794 (0,0018) 0,1217 (0,0009)
1977 0,0218 (0,0010) 0,0588 (0,0015) 0,0304 (0,0011) 0,0372 (0,0012)
1978 0,0638 (0,0011) 0,1135 (0,0014) 0,0766 (0,0012) 0,0832 (0,0012)
1979 0,0938 (0,0012) 0,1447 (0,0014) 0,1098 (0,0014) 0,1083 (0,0012)
1980 0,1093 (0,0014) 0,1548 (0,0015) 0,1276 (0,0016) 0,1192 (0,0012)
1982 0,1529 (0,0018) 0,1872 (0,0015) 0,1751 (0,0021) 0,1454 (0,0013)
1984 0,1962 (0,0022) 0,2349 (0,0015) 0,2227 (0,0025) 0,1769 (0,0013)
1985 0,2135 (0,0024) 0,2510 (0,0015) 0,2408 (0,0028) 0,1830 (0,0013)
1986 0,2427 (0,0027) 0,2676 (0,0015) 0,2706 (0,0030) 0,1991 (0,0013)
1987 0,2609 (0,0029) 0,2731 (0,0015) 0,2894 (0,0033) 0,2038 (0,0013)
Elementary School Education 0,2782 (0,0045) 0,0046 (0,0025) a -0,0145 (0,0023)
Junior High School Education 0,3480 (0,0065) 0,3472 (0,0032) a 0,2445 (0,0031)
High School Graduate 0,3348 (0,0078) 0,4813 (0,0040) a 0,3307 (0,0037)
Basic Vocational-Technical Grad. 0,1279 (0,0045) 0,2578 (0,0024) a 0,1739 (0,0023)
Advanced Vocational-Technical Grad. 0,4032 (0,0079) 0,4464 (0,0040) a 0,3208 (0,0039)
Technical College or Undergrad. Degree 0,6014 (0,0057) 0,6078 (0,0029) a 0,4817 (0,0027)
Graduate School Degree 1,2419 (0,0123) 0,9881 (0,0064) a 0,7933 (0,0059)
Intercept 3,5422 (0,0023) 3,3364 (0,0019) a -0,0518 b
Root mean squared error 0,2855 0,4215 0,2833 0,3420 b
Error degrees of freedom 1.340.697 1.870.554 1.415.775 5.234.086 b
R-squared 0,7466 0,2292 0,7364 0,5715 b
Sample size 1.870.578 1.870.578 1.870.578 5.305.108 b
Notes: The projection method includes the variables for eliminating the firm effect (see Data Appendix for complete list) and is estimated by least squares within person. The
estimates from the projection method are the result of a multi-step process described in the text. (a) Not separately calculated. (b) Pooled estimates of firm means, statistics apply
to pooled men-women equation.
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Table 4
Descriptive Statistics for Components of Log Real Total Compensation by Sex for 1976 to 1987
Men Women
Variable Definition Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Log (Real annual compensation costs, 1980 FF) 4.3442 0.5187 4.0984 0.4801
x$ - Predicted value 0.4261 0.1383 0.3234 0.1120
2 - Total individual effect 3.9160 0.4387 3.7776 0.3843
Sampling variance of 2 0.2714 0.2758 0.3444 0.3299
" -Individual effect not related to education 0.0000 0.3947 0.0000 0.3639
Sampling variance of " 0.1357 0.1379 0.1722 0.1649
u0 -Individual effect related to education 3.9160 0.1915 3.7776 0.1238
Sampling variance of u0 0.1357 0.1379 0.1722 0.1649
R - Total firm effect 0.0028 0.0685 -0.0039 0.0566
Sampling variance of R 0.0019 0.0075 0.0020 0.0075
N - Firm-specific intercept 0.0031 0.1044 -0.0072 0.0969
Sampling variance of N 0.0137 1.8867 0.0065 0.1775
( -Firm-specific seniority slope -3.37e-05 0.0335 8.28e-04 0.0326
1
Sampling variance of ( 0.0009 0.0490 0.0009 0.0576
1
( - Firm-specific slope change at 10 years -5.36e-04 0.0542 -1.64e-03 0.0574
2
Sampling variance of ( 0.0131 1.5672 0.0122 1.3563
2
g - Residual -0.0006 0.2328 0.0012 0.2417
Notes: For sources and methods see the Data Appendix.
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Table 5
Summary Statistics for the Decomposition of Variance Using the Projection Method for Individual Data, both Sexes, 1976-1987
Simple Correlation with:
No. Variable Description Mean StD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 4.2575 0.5189 1.0000 0.3271 0.8401 0.7331 0.4143 0.2131 0.1303 0.0053 -0.0293 0.0276 0.4336y - log (real total compensation)it
2 0.3899 0.1386 0.3271 1.0000 0.0710 -0.0267 0.2211 0.0325 0.0350 -0.0157 -0.0148 0.0077 -0.0048x $ - predicted effect: experience, region, yearit
3 2 -individual effect 3.8672 0.4255 0.8401 0.0710 1.0000 0.9027 0.4303 0.0974 0.0802 -0.0201 -0.0171 0.0203 -0.0243i
4 " -component of individual effect 0.0000 0.3841 0.7331 -0.0267 0.9027 1.0000 0.0000 0.0853 0.0763 -0.0242 -0.0186 0.0186 -0.0233i
5 3.8672 0.1831 0.4143 0.2211 0.4303 0.0000 1.0000 0.0473 0.0263 0.0041 -0.0006 0.0081 -0.0076u0 - component of individual effecti
6 R - firm effect 0.0004 0.0647 0.2131 0.0325 0.0974 0.0853 0.0473 1.0000 0.4428 0.2089 -0.0909 0.0717 -0.0001J(i,t)
7 N - component of firm effect -0.0005 0.1019 0.1303 0.0350 0.0802 0.0763 0.0263 0.4428 1.0000 -0.7844 -0.5625 0.2562 -0.0001J(i,t)
8 0.0009 0.0935 0.0053 -0.0157 -0.0201 -0.0242 0.0041 0.2089 -0.7844 1.0000 0.5507 -0.2298 0.0000( s +( T (s -10) - component1J(i,t) J(i,t)it 2J(i,t) 1 J(i,t)it
9 ( - slope on seniority 0.0003 0.0332 -0.0293 -0.0148 -0.0171 -0.0186 -0.0006 -0.0909 -0.5625 0.5507 1.0000 -0.2094 0.00001J(i,t)
10 ( - slope on seniority spline at 10 years -0.0009 0.0553 0.0276 0.0077 0.0203 0.0186 0.0081 0.0717 0.2562 -0.2298 -0.2094 1.0000 0.00002J(i,t)
11 g - residual 0.0001 0.2360 0.4336 -0.0048 -0.0243 -0.0233 -0.0076 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000it
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Table 6
Descriptive Statistics for Individual Level Variables by "-Category and Number of Employers for 1976 to 1987
Low " Middle " High "
Variable Definition Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
1 Employer
Log (Real Annual Compensation Cost, 1980 FF) 3.859 0.476 4.221 0.302 4.673 0.438
Male 0.640 0.606 0.643
Total Labor Force Experience 15.496 11.861 17.122 12.341 23.826 12.236
x$ - Predicted Value 0.385 0.142 0.378 0.137 0.372 0127
u0 -Individual Effect Related to Education 3.872 0.202 3.845 0.165 3.879 0.183
R - Total Firm Effect 0.000 0.073 0.009 0.066 0.008 0.058
N - Firm-specific Intercept -0.004 0.110 0.011 0.109 0.014 0.114
g - Residual 0.007 0.213 -0.000 0.159 -0.005 0.179
Number of Observations 710,892 773,743 919,119
Percent of Observations in " Category 29.57 % 32.19 % 38.24 %
2 Employers
Log (Real Annual Compensation Cost, 1980 FF) 3.903 0.458 4.209 0.314 4.611 0.433
Male 0.657 0.603 0.584
Total Labor Force Experience 12.678 10.242 14.244 11.034 19.694 11.760
x$ - Predicted Value 0.392 0.143 0.386 0.139 0.389 0.125
u0 -Individual Effect Related to Education 3.876 0.204 3.839 0.155 3.865 0.178
R - Total Firm Effect -0.009 0.064 -0.001 0.056 0.002 0.057
N - Firm-specific Intercept -0.014 0.092 -0.002 0.092 0.001 0.096
g - Residual 0.005 0.298 -0.002 0.197 -0.007 0.222
Number of Observations 460,275 494,574 458,772
Percent of Observations in " Category 32.56 % 34.99 % 32.45 %
3 or More Employers
Log (Real Annual Compensation Cost, 1980 FF) 3.949 0.467 4.235 0.364 4.644 0.478
Male 0.759 0.679 0.660
Total Labor Force Experience 11.488 8.751 12.695 9.745 17.518 10.926
x$ - Predicted Value 0.414 0.149 0.405 0.147 0.413 0.132
u0 -Individual Effect Related to Education 3.896 0.201 3.851 0.158 3.877 0.183
R - Total Firm Effect -0.013 0.070 -0.005 0.063 0.001 0.068
N - Firm-specific Intercept -0.017 0.091 -0.007 0.088 -0.001 0.097
g - Residual 0.007 0.343 0.000 0.255 -0.007 0.275
Number of Observations 595,220 504,083 388,430
Percent of Observations in " Category 40.01 % 33.88 % 26.11 %
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Table 7
Decomposition of Job Changes by " , Previous N and New N
" Category: Low " Middle " High "
N of New Employer: Low N High N Total Low N High N Total Low N High N Total
N of Previous Employer:
Low N 57.1% 17.2% 74.3% 47.6% 19.5% 67.1% 39.5% 20.8% 60.3%
High N 17.8% 7.8% 25.7% 19.6% 13.3% 32.9% 20.3% 19.4% 39.8%
Total 75.0% 25.0% 100.0% 67.2% 32.8% 100.0% 59.8% 40.2% 100.0%
Notes: Cutoff levels for " were -0.1394 and 0.1196. The cutoff level for N was -0.000497. There were 362,686 transitions of Low " workers, 277,153 transitions of Middle " workers and 205,748
transitions of High " workers.
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Table 8
Summary Statistics for Firms Annual Averages over the Life of the Firm
(weighted by inverse sampling probability, 1978-1988)
Variable Definition Mean Std Dev
Average x$ of employees at the firm 0.3906 0.2420
Average " of employees at the firm -0.0549 0.6446
Average u0 of employees at the firm 3.8503 0.2836
N - Firm-specific wage premium -0.0196 0.2707
( - Firm-specific seniority slope 0.0027 0.0775
1
( - Change in seniority slope at 10 years -0.0031 0.1728
2
Number of employees sampled at firm 34.2950 610.4800
Employment at December 31st (thousands) 0.1097 1.6789
Real total assets (millions FF 1980) 59.4769 3,938.9800
Operating Income/Total Assets 0.1254 0.4544
Value-added/Total Assets 1.0051 1.8889
Real total compensation (millions FF 1980) 1.3260 2.3570
Real value added/Employee (thou. FF 1980) 106.7672 936.5212
Real total assets/Employee (thou. FF 1980) 363.0707 21,067.5500
(Engineers, Professionals and Managers)/Employee 0.2362 0.4072
Skilled workers/Employee 0.5414 0.5255
Log(Real total assets) 1.7711 3.3558
Log(Real value added/Employee) 4.5215 1.1050
Log(Real sales/Employee) 5.5673 2.0139
Log(Total employment at December 31) -3.0262 2.1109
Log(Real capital/Employee) 4.7972 2.2710
Age of firm (N=7,385) 19.5023 23.0331
Number of firms 14,717
Notes: For sources and definitions, see the Data Appendix.
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Table 9
Generalized Least Squares Estimates of the Relation Between Productivity, Profitability and Compensation Policies
Dependent variable: Log (VAdded/Worker) Log(Sales/Employee) Operating Inc./Capital
Indepenent Variable Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error
Average predicted wage (x$) 0.6057 (0.0310) 0.4833 (0.0494) 0.0569 (0.0161)
Average individual effect (") 0.2617 (0.0118) 0.1623 (0.0188) 0.0102 (0.0061)
Average education effect (u0) 0.0725 (0.0275) -0.0674 (0.0437) -0.0036 (0.0143)
Firm-specific intercept (N) 0.1240 (0.0343) 0.1128 (0.0546) 0.0415 (0.0179)
Firm-specific seniority slope (( ) 0.1492 (0.1195) 0.2852 (0.1902) 0.0571 (0.0623)
1
Change in slope (( ) -0.0485 (0.0428) -0.1107 (0.0681) -0.0264 (0.0223)
2
(Engineers, Tech., Managers)/Employee 0.6815 (0.0247) 0.8989 (0.0394) -0.1267 (0.0126)
(Skilled Workers)/Employee 0.2167 (0.0190) 0.4979 (0.0302) 0.0094 (0.0099)
Log(Capital/Employee) 0.1017 (0.0025) 0.2290 (0.0039)
Intercept 4.3985 (0.1126) 2.9784 (0.1791) 0.1664 (0.0586)
Note: Models were estimated using 14,717 firms with complete data. All regressions included 2-digit industry effects. All sources are discussed in the Data Appendix.
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Table 10
Generalized Least Squares Estimates of the Relation Between Factors and Compensation Policies
Dependent Variable
Independent Variable Log(Employees) Log(Real Capital) Log(Capital/Employee) EPM/Employee Skilled W/Employee Unskilled W/Employee
Average predicted effect (x$) 0.2541 1.0205 0.7665 0.1142 0.0628 -0.1770
(0.0724) (0.1036) (0.0638) (0.0117) (0.0150) (0.0142)
Average " in firm 0.2764 0.7454 0.4690 0.1231 -0.0316 -0.0914
(0.0273) (0.0391) (0.0241) (0.0043) (0.0055) (0.0052)
Average u0 in firm 0.3478 0.4076 0.0598 0.3307 -0.0964 -0.2343
(0.0643) (0.0921) (0.0567) (0.0101) (0.0129) (0.0122)
Firm-specific N 0.3748 0.7618 0.3869 0.0057 -0.0052 -0.0005
(0.0802) (0.1148) (0.0707) (0.0131) (0.0167) (0.0158)
Firm-specific ( -0.0262 0.5277 0.5539 0.0835 -0.0303 -0.0532
1
(0.2798) (0.4005) (0.2467) (0.0456) (0.0582) (0.0553)
Firm-specific ( 0.0011 0.0497 0.0486 -0.0314 0.0140 0.0174
2
(0.1002) (0.1435) (0.0884) (0.0164) (0.0209) (0.0198)
(Engi., Tech., Managers)/Employee -0.1181 2.0038 2.1219
(0.0568) (0.0812) (0.0500)
(Skilled Workers)/Employee -0.2947 0.0707 0.3654
(0.0445) (0.0637) (0.0392)
Intercept -3.4129 3.0371 6.4499 -0.8485 0.8309 1.0176
(0.2630) (0.3765) (0.2319) (0.0423) (0.0539) (0.0512)
Notes: The models were estimated using the 14,717 firms with complete data. All equations include a set of two-industry effects. Sources and methods are discussed in the Data Appendix. Standard
errors in parentheses.
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Table 11
Proportional Hazards Estimates of the Relation between Firm Survival and Compensation Policies
Parameter Standard Risk
Independent Variable Estimate Error Ratio
Average predicted effect (x$) 2.0751 (0.6241) 7.9650
Average " in firm -0.5327 (0.2064) 0.5870
Average u0 in firm -1.8615 (0.5398) 0.1550
Firm-specific N -0.5909 (0.5356) 0.5540
Firm-specific ( 1.6497 (2.4598) 5.2050
1
Firm-specific ( 0.3592 (0.6677) 1.4320
2
(Eng., Tech., Managers)/Employee 0.4096 (0.3699) 1.5060
(Skilled Workers)/Employee 0.3372 (0.2926) 1.4010
Notes: Negative coefficients indicate a reduced probability of firm death. This model was estimated using the 7,382
firms with known birth dates. The model includes two-digit industry effects.
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Table 12
Generalized Least Squares Estimates of the Relation between Industry Wage Effects and Industry Averages of Firm-specific Compensation Policies
Independent Variable Coefficient Error Coefficient Error Coefficient Error
Standard Standard Standard
Industry average x$ -0.5123 (0.0116)
Industry average " 0.7505 (0.0025) 0.8324 (0.0017)
Industry average u0 0.3947 (0.0096)
Industry average N 0.3350 (0.0153) -0.6659 (0.0150)
Industry average ( 0.8726 (0.1359) -18.2220 (0.1256)
1
Industry average ( 1.8595 (0.1011) 2.9917 (0.0979)
2
Intercept 1.7854 (0.0339) 3.1088 (0.0019) 3.0687 (0.0019)
R 0.9664 0.9213 0.2486
2
Notes: The dependent variable is the 83 industry-effects estimated by least squares controlling for labor force experience (through quartic), region, year, education (eight
categories) and sex (fully interacted). The independent variables are the industry averages for the indicated firm-specific compensation policy. The time period is 1976-
1987.
A Data Appendix
A.1 Description of the DAS
The DAS is a large data set of matched employer-employee information collected by
INSEE (Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques). The data
cover all individuals employed in French enterprises who were born in October of even-
numbered years, with civil servants excluded.
12
Our extract runs from 1976 through
1987, with 1981 and 1983 excluded because the underlying administrative data were
not sampled in those years. The initial data set contained 7,416,422 observations.
Each observation corresponds to a unique establishment-individual-year combination.
The observation includes an identier that corresponds to the employee (called ID
below), an identier that corresponds to the establishment (SIRET) and an identier
that corresponds to the parent enterprise of the establishment (SIREN). We have
information on the number of days the individual worked in the establishment, as
well as the full-time/part-time status of the employee. This allows us to aggregate
all of the establishments in which an individual worked in a given year, and thus not
treat changes of establishment within the same enterprise as if they were changes of
employer. Each observation also includes, in addition to the variables listed above,
the sex, month, year and place of birth, occupation, total net nominal earnings during
the year and annualized gross nominal earnings during the year for the individual, as
well as the location and industry of the employing establishment.
A.2 Observation selection variable creation and missing
data imputation
A.2.1 Aggregation of establishments
The creation of the analysis data set involved the selection of desired individuals, the
aggregation of establishment-level data to the enterprise level, and the construction
of the variables of interest from the variables already in the data set. We selected
only full-time employees (sample reduced to 5,966,620 observations). We then created
a single observation for each ID-year-SIREN combination by aggregating within ID
and year over SIRETs in the same SIREN. For each ID-year-SIREN, we summed
total net nominal earnings and total days worked over all SIRETs. We used the
occupation, location and industry that corresponded to the establishment in which
the individual worked the largest number of days during the year. This reduced the
number of observations to 5,965,256. We then selected the enterprise at which the
individual had worked the largest number of days during that year (sample reduced
to 5,497,287 observations). The aggregation of total number of days worked across
all establishments occasionally yielded observations for which the total number of
days worked was greater than 360 (the maximum permitted). In these cases, we just
truncated days worked at 360. We then calculated an annualized net nominal earnings
for the ID-year SIREN combination. We eliminated all years of data for individuals
12
Meron (1988) shows that individuals employed in the civil service move almost exclusively
to other positions within the civil service. Thus the exclusion of civil servants does not aect
the estimation of a worker's market value.
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who were younger than 15 years old or older than 65 years old at the date of their rst
appearance in the data set (sample reduced to 5,325,413 observations).
A.2.2 Total compensation costs
The dependent variable in our wage rate analysis is the annualized real total com-
pensation cost of the employee (LFRAISRE). To convert the annualized net nominal
earnings to total compensation costs, we used the tax rules and computer programs
provided by the Division Revenus at INSEE (J.L. Lheritier, private communication)
to compute both the employee and employer share of all mandatory payroll taxes (co-
tisations et charges salariales employe et employeur) Total annualized compensation
cost is dened as the sum of annualized net nominal earnings, employee payroll taxes
and employer payroll taxes. Nominal values were then deated by a consumer price
index to get real annualized net earnings, and real annualized total compensation cost.
We eliminated 61 observations with zero values for annualized total compensation cost
(remaining sample 5,325,352).
A.2.3 Education and Total Labor Market Experience
Our initial DAS le did not contain education information. We used supplementary
information available for 10% of the DAS, (EDP, Echantillon Demographique Per-
manent) to impute the level of education of all individuals in the DAS.
13
The EDP
includes information on the highest degree obtained. There were 38 possible responses,
including \no known degree." These responses were grouped into 8 degree-level cat-
egories as shown in table 1. Using these eight categories and data available in the
DAS, we ran separate ordered logits for men and women to estimate coecients used
to impute education for the individuals in the DAS who are not part of the EDP. EDP
sample statistics for the men are in table 2, and those for the women are in table 3.
The estimated logit equations are in table 4 for men and table 5 for women.
13
Access to the EDP is particularly dicult to obtain due to privacy regulations.
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Table 1: Degree Categories
Category Degree U.S. Equivalent
1 Sans Aucun Diplo^me No Terminal Degree
2 CEP Elementary School
DFEO
3 BEPC Junior High School
BE
BEPS
4 BAC (not F, G or H) High School
Brevet superieur
CFES
5 CAP Vocational-Technical School (Basic)
BEP
EFAA
BAA
BPA
FPA 1er
6 BP Vocational-Technical School (Advanced)
BEA
BEC
BEH
BEI
BES
BATA
BAC F
BAC G
BAC H
7 Sante Technical College and
BTS Undergraduate University
DUT
DEST
DEUL
DEUS
DEUG
8 2eme cycle Graduate School and Other
3eme cycle Post-Secondary Education
Grande ecole
CAPES
CAPET
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Table 2: EDP Sample Statistics - Men (Std. Deviations in Parentheses)
Variable Degree Category
Name Overall 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
DOB
i
 1924 0.188 0.254 0.295 0.160 0.136 0.055 0.098 0.063 0.186
(0.391) (0.435) (0.456) (0.367) (0.343) (0.228) (0.297) (0.243) (0.389)
1925  DOB
i
 1929 0.056 0.062 0.085 0.042 0.049 0.034 0.048 0.026 0.065
(0.230) (0.242) (0.279) (0.200) (0.215) (0.180) (0.214) (0.158) (0.247)
1930  DOB
i
 1934 0.097 0.109 0.120 0.067 0.068 0.081 0.095 0.054 0.101
(0.296) (0.311) (0.325) (0.250) (0.252) (0.273) (0.293) (0.226) (0.301)
1935  DOB
i
 1939 0.061 0.056 0.070 0.048 0.048 0.063 0.079 0.047 0.078
(0.240) (0.229) (0.255) (0.214) (0.215) (0.244) (0.270) (0.212) (0.268)
1940  DOB
i
 1944 0.094 0.070 0.091 0.075 0.098 0.117 0.133 0.118 0.149
(0.292) (0.256) (0.287) (0.264) (0.298) (0.322) (0.340) (0.323) (0.356)
1945  DOB
i
 1949 0.102 0.064 0.097 0.099 0.130 0.130 0.152 0.175 0.164
(0.302) (0.244) (0.296) (0.299) (0.336) (0.336) (0.359) (0.380) (0.370)
1950  DOB
i
 1954 0.159 0.095 0.132 0.166 0.245 0.224 0.217 0.288 0.201
(0.365) (0.293) (0.339) (0.372) (0.430) (0.417) (0.412) (0.453) (0.401)
1955  DOB
i
 1959 0.101 0.072 0.060 0.182 0.157 0.145 0.110 0.176 0.054
(0.302) (0.259) (0.238) (0.386) (0.364) (0.352) (0.313) (0.381) (0.226)
1960  DOB
i
 1976 0.141 0.218 0.050 0.160 0.069 0.151 0.068 0.052 0.003
(0.348) (0.413) (0.218) (0.367) (0.253) (0.358) (0.251) (0.224) (0.056)
Works in Ile de France 0.232 0.204 0.226 0.288 0.352 0.187 0.284 0.309 0.457
(0.422) (0.403) (0.418) (0.453) (0.478) (0.390) (0.451) (0.462) (0.498)
CSP62 0.263 0.357 0.282 0.188 0.157 0.199 0.145 0.184 0.105
(0.440) (0.479) (0.450) (0.391) (0.364) (0.399) (0.352) (0.387) (0.307)
CSP61 0.225 0.231 0.255 0.117 0.071 0.299 0.186 0.096 0.058
(0.418) (0.422) (0.436) (0.321) (0.266) (0.458) (0.390) (0.295) (0.233)
CSP50 0.151 0.118 0.166 0.279 0.279 0.108 0.203 0.235 0.203
(0.358) (0.322) (0.372) (0.448) (0.448) (0.310) (0.402) (0.424) (0.402)
CSP40 0.112 0.061 0.110 0.173 0.233 0.080 0.258 0.275 0.225
(0.315) (0.240) (0.314) (0.379) (0.423) (0.272) (0.438) (0.447) (0.418)
CSP30 0.043 0.020 0.025 0.053 0.147 0.015 0.057 0.080 0.359
(0.203) (0.142) (0.157) (0.224) (0.354) (0.121) (0.232) (0.271) (0.480)
Number of Observations 71229 26236 12825 3847 3036 16489 3878 2387 2531
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Table 3: EDP Sample Statistics - Women (Std. Deviations in Parentheses)
Variable Degree Category
Name Overall 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
DOB
i
 1924 0.152 0.235 0.206 0.129 0.055 0.034 0.042 0.055 0.056
(0.359) (0.424) (0.405) (0.336) (0.229) (0.181) (0.202) (0.228) (0.230)
1925  DOB
i
 1929 0.047 0.053 0.078 0.045 0.025 0.024 0.017 0.022 0.023
(0.212) (0.224) (0.268) (0.206) (0.156) (0.153) (0.130) (0.146) (0.148)
1930  DOB
i
 1934 0.084 0.096 0.118 0.070 0.043 0.061 0.054 0.049 0.052
(0.278) (0.294) (0.322) (0.255) (0.203) (0.239) (0.226) (0.216) (0.222)
1935  DOB
i
 1939 0.054 0.056 0.069 0.047 0.036 0.050 0.045 0.038 0.047
(0.226) (0.229) (0.254) (0.211) (0.185) (0.218) (0.208) (0.190) (0.212)
1940  DOB
i
 1944 0.093 0.070 0.113 0.086 0.090 0.103 0.108 0.101 0.127
(0.290) (0.255) (0.317) (0.281) (0.287) (0.304) (0.311) (0.301) (0.334)
1945  DOB
i
 1949 0.114 0.077 0.125 0.109 0.116 0.135 0.164 0.156 0.209
(0.317) (0.267) (0.331) (0.311) (0.321) (0.341) (0.371) (0.363) (0.407)
1950  DOB
i
 1954 0.186 0.112 0.180 0.167 0.285 0.247 0.252 0.298 0.354
(0.389) (0.315) (0.384) (0.373) (0.451) (0.431) (0.434) (0.457) (0.478)
1955  DOB
i
 1959 0.120 0.078 0.067 0.178 0.217 0.166 0.169 0.223 0.125
(0.325) (0.267) (0.251) (0.383) (0.412) (0.372) (0.375) (0.416) (0.331)
1960  DOB
i
 1976 0.150 0.224 0.043 0.170 0.133 0.180 0.147 0.059 0.008
(0.357) (0.417) (0.202) (0.375) (0.339) (0.384) (0.355) (0.236) (0.088)
Works in Ile de France 0.254 0.237 0.239 0.286 0.333 0.221 0.316 0.283 0.466
(0.435) (0.425) (0.426) (0.452) (0.471) (0.415) (0.465) (0.451) (0.499)
CSP62 0.227 0.343 0.296 0.108 0.079 0.126 0.073 0.061 0.053
(0.419) (0.475) (0.456) (0.310) (0.270) (0.331) (0.259) (0.240) (0.224)
CSP61 0.050 0.061 0.067 0.027 0.023 0.044 0.027 0.029 0.015
(0.218) (0.239) (0.249) (0.163) (0.150) (0.205) (0.161) (0.168) (0.120)
CSP50 0.458 0.365 0.427 0.596 0.570 0.539 0.630 0.420 0.511
(0.498) (0.482) (0.495) (0.491) (0.495) (0.498) (0.483) (0.494) (0.500)
CSP40 0.073 0.040 0.035 0.090 0.165 0.045 0.097 0.350 0.214
(0.261) (0.195) (0.185) (0.286) (0.371) (0.208) (0.296) (0.477) (0.410)
CSP30 0.013 0.008 0.005 0.016 0.048 0.005 0.009 0.032 0.150
(0.115) (0.090) (0.068) (0.125) (0.214) (0.071) (0.093) (0.176) (0.357)
Number of Observations 57677 19822 12768 4760 3112 10388 2633 3173 1021
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Table 4: Degree Category Model Coecients-Men
Degree Variable Coecient Std. Err.
1 Intercept 6.254 0.122
1925  Date of Birth  1929 -0.496 0.105
1930  Date of Birth  1934 -0.493 0.090
1935  Date of Birth  1939 -1.234 0.100
1940  Date of Birth  1944 -2.031 0.085
1945  Date of Birth  1949 -2.818 0.085
1950  Date of Birth  1954 -3.388 0.086
1955  Date of Birth  1959 -2.289 0.113
1960  Date of Birth  1976 1.897 0.360
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -0.850 0.116
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -0.904 0.132
Unskilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -2.758 0.111
Skilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -4.028 0.117
Manager at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -5.892 0.124
Works in Ile de France -0.627 0.048
2 Intercept 5.828 0.125
1925  Date of Birth  1929 -0.320 0.106
1930  Date of Birth  1934 -0.518 0.091
1935  Date of Birth  1939 -1.117 0.102
1940  Date of Birth  1944 -1.863 0.087
1945  Date of Birth  1949 -2.430 0.087
1950  Date of Birth  1954 -3.248 0.089
1955  Date of Birth  1959 -2.649 0.119
1960  Date of Birth  1976 0.246 0.363
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -1.311 0.119
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -1.074 0.135
Unskilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -2.635 0.114
Skilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -3.740 0.121
Manager at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -5.996 0.132
Works in Ile de France -0.629 0.050
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Degree Variable Coecient Std. Err.
3 Intercept 2.465 0.134
1925  Date of Birth  1929 -0.333 0.131
1930  Date of Birth  1934 -0.344 0.112
1935  Date of Birth  1939 -0.667 0.124
1940  Date of Birth  1944 -1.120 0.105
1945  Date of Birth  1949 -1.307 0.102
1950  Date of Birth  1954 -1.373 0.100
1955  Date of Birth  1959 0.074 0.123
1960  Date of Birth  1976 2.891 0.364
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -0.681 0.126
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -0.557 0.144
Unskilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -0.944 0.118
Skilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -1.610 0.127
Manager at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -3.400 0.142
Works in Ile de France -0.410 0.057
4 Intercept 0.803 0.142
1925  Date of Birth  1929 0.005 0.133
1930  Date of Birth  1934 -0.109 0.117
1935  Date of Birth  1939 -0.325 0.130
1940  Date of Birth  1944 -0.381 0.106
1945  Date of Birth  1949 -0.379 0.104
1950  Date of Birth  1954 -0.069 0.101
1955  Date of Birth  1959 0.830 0.127
1960  Date of Birth  1976 2.855 0.369
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -0.193 0.134
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -0.294 0.156
Unskilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -0.217 0.125
Skilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -0.377 0.132
Manager at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -1.311 0.136
Works in Ile de France -0.265 0.057
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Degree Variable Coecient Std. Err.
5 Intercept 3.985 0.125
1925  Date of Birth  1929 0.392 0.113
1930  Date of Birth  1934 0.734 0.096
1935  Date of Birth  1939 0.446 0.105
1940  Date of Birth  1944 0.090 0.089
1945  Date of Birth  1949 -0.336 0.089
1950  Date of Birth  1954 0.700 0.090
1955  Date of Birth  1959 0.230 0.116
1960  Date of Birth  1976 3.319 0.362
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -1.306 0.116
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -0.340 0.131
Unskilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -2.494 0.110
Skilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -3.011 0.117
Manager at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -5.195 0.131
Works in Ile de France -0.766 0.049
6 Intercept 1.714 0.139
1925  Date of Birth  1929 0.266 0.132
1930  Date of Birth  1934 0.471 0.111
1935  Date of Birth  1939 0.318 0.119
1940  Date of Birth  1944 0.000 0.102
1945  Date of Birth  1949 -0.216 0.102
1950  Date of Birth  1954 -0.363 0.103
1955  Date of Birth  1959 0.312 0.130
1960  Date of Birth  1976 2.742 0.368
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -0.849 0.129
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -0.006 0.142
Unskilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -1.100 0.121
Skilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -1.030 0.126
Manager at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -3.036 0.141
Works in Ile de France -0.510 0.056
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Degree Variable Coecient Std. Err.
7 Intercept -0.141 0.158
1925  Date of Birth  1929 0.102 0.179
1930  Date of Birth  1934 0.407 0.145
1935  Date of Birth  1939 0.349 0.154
1940  Date of Birth  1944 0.519 0.126
1945  Date of Birth  1949 0.653 0.123
1950  Date of Birth  1954 0.843 0.121
1955  Date of Birth  1959 1.704 0.145
1960  Date of Birth  1976 3.339 0.379
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -0.155 0.136
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -0.055 0.157
Unskilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -0.437 0.129
Skilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -0.100 0.134
Manager at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -1.648 0.148
Works in Ile de France -0.399 0.062
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Table 5: Degree Category Model Coecients-Women
Degree Variable Coecient Std. Err.
1 Intercept 7.296 0.205
1925  Date of Birth  1929 -0.723 0.257
1930  Date of Birth  1934 -0.999 0.199
1935  Date of Birth  1939 -1.393 0.206
1940  Date of Birth  1944 -2.328 0.169
1945  Date of Birth  1949 -3.023 0.161
1950  Date of Birth  1954 -3.791 0.156
1955  Date of Birth  1959 -3.082 0.172
1960  Date of Birth  1976 1.070 0.382
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -0.205 0.195
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -0.634 0.295
Unskilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -2.250 0.144
Skilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -3.853 0.161
Manager at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -5.449 0.191
Works in Ile de France -0.925 0.069
2 Intercept 7.148 0.206
1925  Date of Birth  1929 -0.224 0.257
1930  Date of Birth  1934 -0.683 0.200
1935  Date of Birth  1939 -1.073 0.207
1940  Date of Birth  1944 -1.743 0.169
1945  Date of Birth  1949 -2.429 0.161
1950  Date of Birth  1954 -3.433 0.157
1955  Date of Birth  1959 -3.323 0.175
1960  Date of Birth  1976 -0.673 0.384
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -0.787 0.196
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -0.977 0.296
Unskilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -2.466 0.146
Skilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -4.352 0.165
Manager at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -6.431 0.216
Works in Ile de France -0.983 0.070
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Degree Variable Coecient Std. Err.
3 Intercept 4.645 0.211
1925  Date of Birth  1929 -0.307 0.265
1930  Date of Birth  1934 -0.742 0.207
1935  Date of Birth  1939 -1.021 0.217
1940  Date of Birth  1944 -1.550 0.177
1945  Date of Birth  1949 -2.011 0.167
1950  Date of Birth  1954 -2.537 0.162
1955  Date of Birth  1959 -1.409 0.176
1960  Date of Birth  1976 1.506 0.385
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -0.778 0.202
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -0.840 0.308
Unskilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -1.218 0.149
Skilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -2.379 0.166
Manager at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -3.977 0.209
Works in Ile de France -0.738 0.074
4 Intercept 2.263 0.223
1925  Date of Birth  1929 0.023 0.285
1930  Date of Birth  1934 -0.314 0.225
1935  Date of Birth  1939 -0.383 0.233
1940  Date of Birth  1944 -0.542 0.189
1945  Date of Birth  1949 -0.894 0.180
1950  Date of Birth  1954 -0.694 0.172
1955  Date of Birth  1959 0.075 0.187
1960  Date of Birth  1976 2.448 0.390
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -0.248 0.210
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -0.167 0.320
Unskilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -0.502 0.154
Skilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -0.880 0.169
Manager at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -1.725 0.193
Works in Ile de France -0.462 0.076
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Degree Variable Coecient Std. Err.
5 Intercept 4.555 0.211
1925  Date of Birth  1929 0.391 0.267
1930  Date of Birth  1934 0.441 0.208
1935  Date of Birth  1939 0.371 0.214
1940  Date of Birth  1944 -0.057 0.177
1945  Date of Birth  1949 -0.529 0.168
1950  Date of Birth  1954 -1.022 0.163
1955  Date of Birth  1959 -0.342 0.178
1960  Date of Birth  1976 2.753 0.385
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -0.898 0.196
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -0.645 0.297
Unskilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -1.593 0.144
Skilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -3.272 0.162
Manager at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -5.147 0.218
Works in Ile de France -0.967 0.070
6 Intercept 2.693 0.231
1925  Date of Birth  1929 -0.148 0.309
1930  Date of Birth  1934 0.111 0.233
1935  Date of Birth  1939 0.054 0.241
1940  Date of Birth  1944 -0.210 0.199
1945  Date of Birth  1949 -0.461 0.189
1950  Date of Birth  1954 -0.927 0.184
1955  Date of Birth  1959 -0.264 0.199
1960  Date of Birth  1976 2.531 0.396
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -0.969 0.212
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -0.675 0.320
Unskilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -1.008 0.153
Skilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -2.062 0.174
Manager at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -4.133 0.272
Works in Ile de France -0.541 0.078
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Degree Variable Coecient Std. Err.
7 Intercept 2.278 0.223
1925  Date of Birth  1929 -0.137 0.289
1930  Date of Birth  1934 -0.201 0.224
1935  Date of Birth  1939 -0.361 0.233
1940  Date of Birth  1944 -0.439 0.189
1945  Date of Birth  1949 -0.552 0.178
1950  Date of Birth  1954 -0.601 0.173
1955  Date of Birth  1959 0.153 0.187
1960  Date of Birth  1976 1.638 0.395
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -0.511 0.213
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) 0.064 0.315
Unskilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -0.749 0.155
Skilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -0.047 0.166
Manager at Date t in Firm J(i; t) -2.052 0.201
Works in Ile de France -0.738 0.077
44
With these estimated coecients, we were able to calculate the probability that a
given individual would have a degree in a particular category. We used the data cor-
responding to the earliest date that an individual appeared in our sample to calculate
these probabilities. The probability that a given individual i has a degree in category
n was calculated as follows. For all ~n 2 f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7g, let
PRE
~n
i
= exp
 
X
i

~n

;
where X
i
represents the vector of covariates for individual i and 
~n
corresponds to
the vector of coecients for degrees of category ~n. Let
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i
=
7
X
~n=1
PRE
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i
:
Now, if n 2 f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7g,
P (degree category
i
= n) =
PRE
n
i
1 + PRE
i
;
and if n = 8,
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i
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#
:
We used this degree category (actual, where possible, otherwise imputed) for all ob-
servations on the individual.
To calculate school leaving age we used table 14 in CEREQ-DEP-INSEE (1990),
which provides the average age of termination for each French diploma separately for
men and women in 1986. Using the probability of each degree category and the average
school-leaving age for degrees in that category (the ages were fairly homogeneous
within categories), we calculated expected school-leaving age.
A.2.4 Job Seniority and Total Labor Market Experience
Individuals fell into two categories with respect to the calculation of job seniority
(employer-specic experience): those for whom the rst year of observation was 1976
and those who rst appeared after 1976. For those individuals whose rst observation
was in 1976, we estimated the expected length of the in-progress employment spell by
a regression analysis using a supplementary survey, the 1978 Enque^te sur la Structure
des Salaires (ESS, Salary Structure Survey). In this survey, respondent establishments
provided information on seniority (in 1978), occupation, date of birth, industry, and
work location for a scientic sample of their employees. Using the ESS information,
we estimated separate regressions for men and women to predict seniority in 1976.
The coecients from these regressions were used to calculate expected job seniority in
1976 for DAS individuals whose rst observation was in 1976. The dependent variable
in the supplementary ESS regressions was current seniority with the employer and the
explanatory variables were date of birth (DOB), occupation (CSP, 1-digit), region of
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employment (metropolitan Paris), and industry (NAP 100, approximately 2-digit).
14
Table 6 provides sample statistics for the ESS data. Results of these regressions are
Table 6: ESS Variables and Means (Std. Deviations in Parentheses)
Variable Mean-Men Mean-Women
Seniority
i;t;J(i;t)
10.244 7.910
(9.271) (7.796)
DOB
i
 1924 0.113 0.095
(0.317) (0.293)
1925  DOB
i
 1929 0.112 0.087
(0.315) (0.281)
1930  DOB
i
 1934 0.124 0.097
(0.330) (0.296)
1935  DOB
i
 1939 0.115 0.088
(0.319) (0.283)
1940  DOB
i
 1944 0.111 0.087
(0.314) (0.282)
1945  DOB
i
 1949 0.153 0.145
(0.360) (0.352)
1950  DOB
i
 1954 0.154 0.188
(0.361) (0.391)
1955  DOB
i
 1959 0.094 0.174
(0.292) (0.379)
Worked in Ile de France
i;t;J(i;t)
0.191 0.233
(0.393) (0.423)
CSP30
i;t;J(i;t)
0.106 0.026
(0.308) (0.161)
CSP40
i;t;J(i;t)
0.175 0.072
(0.380) (0.258)
CSP50
i;t;J(i;t)
0.180 0.492
(0.384) (0.500)
CSP61
i;t;J(i;t)
0.283 0.064
(0.450) (0.245)
CSP62
i;t;J(i;t)
0.256 0.346
(0.437) (0.476)
14
The excluded categories were: 1960DOB
i
, CSP62 (1 if i is an Unskilled Blue-Collar
Worker at Date t in rm J(i; t)), and N89 (1 if rm J(i; t) is in industry 89, Financial Orga-
nizations). The coecients on the industry indicators are not shown below.
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shown in equations 33 for men and 34 for women.
seniority
i;t;J(i;t)
= 2:513
(0:081)
+14:151 [DOB
i
 1924] +12:820 [1925  DOB
i
 1929]
(0:067) (0:067)
+10:299 [1930  DOB
i
 1934] +7:445 [1935  DOB
i
 1939]
(0:066) (0:067)
+4:748 [1940  DOB
i
 1944] +2:569 [1945  DOB
i
 1949]
(0:067) (0:065)
+0:612 [1950  DOB
i
 1954]  0:642 [1955  DOB
i
 1959]
(0:065) (0:067)
+4:039 CSP30
i;t;J(i;t)
+4:939 CSP40
i;t;J(i;t)
(0:038) (0:031)
+1:885 CSP50
i;t;J(i;t)
+2:898 CSP61
i;t;J(i;t)
(0:037) (0:027)
 0:958 Ile de France
i;t;J(i;t)
(0:026)
N = 547; 746
R
2
= 0:461
(33)
seniority
i;t;J(i;t)
= 2:114
(0:084)
+12:669 [DOB
i
 1924] +11:014 [1925  DOB
i
 1929]
(0:074) (0:075)
+8:979 [1930  DOB
i
 1934] +7:278 [1935  DOB
i
 1939]
(0:073) (0:074)
+5:989 [1940  DOB
i
 1944] +4:604 [1945  DOB
i
 1949]
(0:075) (0:070)
+2:822 [1950  DOB
i
 1954] +0:641 [1955  DOB
i
 1959]
(0:068) (0:068)
+5:116 CSP30
i;t;J(i;t)
+5:789 CSP40
i;t;J(i;t)
(0:082) (0:057)
+1:442 CSP50
i;t;J(i;t)
+2:429 CSP61
i;t;J(i;t)
(0:037) (0:054)
 0:988 Ile de France
i;t;J(i;t)
(0:031)
N = 260; 580
R
2
= 0:373
(34)
where
DOB
i
= Date of Birth of Individual i
CSP30
i;t;J(i;t)
= 1 if i is a Engineer, Professional or Manager at Date t in Firm J(i; t)
CSP40
i;t;J(i;t)
= 1 if i is Technician or Technical White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t)
CSP50
i;t;J(i;t)
= 1 if i is any other White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t)
CSP61
i;t;J(i;t)
= 1 if i is a Skilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t)
CSP62
i;t;J(i;t)
= 1 if i is an Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i; t)
Ile de France
i;t;J(i;t)
= 1 if the Establishment of Firm J(i; t) is in Paris-Ile de France.
(35)
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We used these results to impute levels of job seniority in 1976 for the left-
censored DAS individuals rst observed in 1976. If the individual was left-
censored and the imputed job seniority was negative, we set job seniority prior
to 1976 to zero. If the individual was rst observed after 1976, we assumed that
job seniority prior to the date of the rst DAS observation for the individual was
zero. If the age at the date of any observation (1976 or otherwise) was less than
the expected school-leaving age, both total labor force experience and prior job
seniority were set to zero. In all other cases (when the age was greater than
the expected school-leaving age), we calculated total labor market experience
and job seniority as follows. If the observation was the earliest appearance
of the individual in our data, we set job seniority equal to job seniority up
to the date of the rst observation plus the number of days worked for that
enterprise in the year of the rst observation, divided by 360 and we set total
labor market experience to the current age less the school-leaving age. If the
observation was not the rst for the individual but there was an observation in
the previous year for the person
15
, we added 1 to total labor market experience.
If the individual was employed for the majority of the current year by the
same enterprise that employed him or her for the majority of the previous year,
i.e. SIREN
t
= SIREN
t 1
, we added 1 to the level of seniority at t   1. If
SIREN
t
6= SIREN
t 1
, we set seniority equal to the number of days worked
divided by 360.
If, on the other hand, there was no observation in the previous year, we
distinguished between t =1982 or t =1984 and other years. When t 6=1982 or
1984, total labor market experience was increased by 1 (reecting experience
gained in the year of the observation). If the current SIREN and the most
recent previous SIREN were the same, we added the number of days worked
over 360 to the most previous level of seniority. This is similar to assuming that
the worker was temporarily laid o, but retained his or her seniority in the rm
when recalled. Otherwise, we set seniority to the number of days worked over
360.
In the case where t =1982 or t =1984, if the preceding observation was 2
years earlier (i.e. the missing data only occurred over a period when no data were
available for any individual), we increased total labor market experience by 2. If
SIREN
t 2
= SIREN
t
,seniority was increased by 2. If SIREN
t 2
6= SIREN
t
,
seniority was increased by 0.5 plus the number of days worked over 360
16
.
15
The structure of our database is such that this condition (observations for individual i
at both t and t   1) could only fail to be satised under 3 conditions. The rst is that the
individual was employed in the civil service in the intervening years. The second is that the
individual was unemployed for an entire calendar year. The third is that t =1982 or t =1984,
since we were not given access to the data for these years. We largely discount the rst
possibility, since full-time civil servants rarely move out of the civil service one they have
entered (Meron (1988)). The other two possibilities are treated explicitly.
16
We assumed that the probability the individual was reemployed in the missing year was
equal to the probability that the individual was reemployed in the observation year. Thus the
expected increment to job seniority is the share of the year worked in the observation year
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If the preceding observation was more than 2 years earlier, we increased total
labor market experience by 1.5
17
. If the current SIREN and the most recent
previous SIREN were the same, we added the number of days worked over 360
plus 0.5 to the most previous level of seniority. This is similar to assuming
that the worker was recalled from temporary layo with equal probability in
the observation year and in the missing year. If the two SIRENs were dierent,
we set seniority to 0.5 plus the number of days worked over 360.
A.2.5 Elimination of Outliers
After calculating all of the individual level variables, we eliminated observations
for which the log of the real annualized total compensation cost (LFRAISRE
it
)
was more than ve standard deviations away from its predicted value based
on a linear regression model with dependent variable LFRAISRE
it
, shown in
equation (36). This gives us the analysis sample of 5,305,108 observations.
LFRAISRE
it
=  3:250
(0:005)
+0:210 Male
i
+0:123 Ile de France
it
(0:000) (0:000)
+0:082 Year
t
+0:056 Degree Category 2
i
(0:000) (0:002)
+0:415 Degree Category 3
i
+0:627 Degree Category 4
i
(0:002) (0:003)
+0:266 Degree Category 5
i
+0:642 Degree Category 6
i
(0:001) (0:003)
+0:648 Degree Category 7
i
+1:421 Degree Category 8
i
(0:002) (0:003)
+0:055 Experience
it
 0:222 Experience
2
it
(0:000) (0:003)
+0:052 Experience
3
it
 0:005 Experience
4
it
(0:001) (0:000)
N = 5; 325; 352
R
2
= 0:437
 = 0:477
(36)
plus
 
1
2
 0

+
 
1
2
 1

= 0:5.
17
We assumed that the probability the individual was reemployed in the missing year was
equal to the probability that the individualwas reemployed in the observation year. Thus the
expected increment to total labor market experience is
 
1
2
 1

+
 
1
2
 2

= 1:5.
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A.3 Supplementary information on projection method vari-
ables
The derivation of the individual and rm eects took place in three basic steps:
an estimation of the \rst-step equation" derived as equation (6), an extraction
and decomposition of the individual eect

^

i

into observable (u
i
) and un-
observable (
i
) components, and a decomposition of the correlated component
(~z
it
) into the enterprise-specic constant eect (
j
), the enterprise-specic co-
ecient on seniority (
1j
) and the enterprise-specic coecient on the linear
spline at seniority of 10 years (
2j
).
A.3.1 The First-Step Regression
Equation (5) represents the projection of the rm-specic variables onto rm
and individual data. In order to estimate the rst-step equation (9), we require
(in addition to the seniority variable derived in section A.2.4 above) some rm
specic variable (denoted f
J(i;t)t
in equation (5) and a vector of means of some
individual specic variables (denoted x
i
in equation (5). We calculated rm em-
ployment directly from the rms represented in the DAS data. The sampling
scheme of the DAS ensures that we have a
1
25
sample of the private French work-
ing population. Since we have 10 years worth of data on the French economy,
we calculated f
J(i;t)
as:
f
J
(i;t)
=
(2:5Number of DAS Observations for Firm
J
(i; t))
1000
  8:3:
Although this measure does not vary over time for a particular rm, it does
vary over time for an individual who changes employers, which is the essence
of our identication of rm eects relative to individual eects. The vector x
it
in equation (5) includes time-varying individual-specic variables. The vector
x
i
in equation (5) contains the individual specic means of the two individual-
specic variables onto which the rm eect was projected: individual i's total
labor market experience and total labor market experience squared at date t.
These individual-specic means were used in the calculation of the matrix z
it
.
Table 7 presents the variables appearing in the matrix z
it
.
The rst step equation (9) requires that the variables all be restated in
terms of deviations from individual-specic means shown below for men with
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Table 7: z
it
Variables and Means (Std. Deviations in Parentheses)
Variable Variable Name Mean
Firm Employment*Mean Experience
i
ZX
it
15.710
(746.422)
Firm Employment*Mean Experience
2
i
ZX2
it
4.032
(222.783)
Firm Employment*Mean Experience
i
*Seniority
it
SX
it
726.375
(8,747.38)
Firm Employment*Mean Experience
2
i
*Seniority
it
SX2
it
178.764
(2,752.69)
Firm Employment*Mean Experience
i
*Seniority
2
it
S2X
it
7,766.07
(135,011.21)
Firm Employment*Mean Experience
2
i
*Seniority
2
it
S2X2
it
2,175.18
(43,035.26)
more than one observation (37)
LFRAISRE
it
= 0:073 EXPER
it
 0:451 EXPER2
it
+0:107 EXPER3
it
(0:000) (0:003) (0:001)
 0:009 EXPER4
4
it
+0:080 ILEDF
it
+0:084 AN77
it
(0:000) (0:001) (0:001)
+0:169 AN78
it
+0:266 AN79
it
+0:394 AN80
it
(0:001) (0:001) (0:001)
+0:615 AN82
it
+0:803 AN84
it
+0:860 AN85
it
(0:001) (0:002) (0:002)
+0:880 AN86
it
+0:906 AN87
it
+5.237e-5 ZX
it
(0:002) (0:002) (2.96e-6)
 1.477e-6 ZX2
it
 8.001e-6 SX
it
+1.977e-5 SX2
it
(1.002e-5) (2.8e-7) (1.00e-6)
+6.99e-7 S2X
it
 1.883e-6 S2X2
it
(2e-8) (6e-8)
N = 3; 248; 901
R
2
= 0:604
 = 0:245
(37)
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and for women with more than one observation (38).
LFRAISRE
it
= 0:033 EXPER
it
 0:180 EXPER2
it
+0:040 EXPER3
it
(0:000) (0:004) (0:001)
 0:003 EXPER4
4
it
+0:078 ILEDF
it
+0:086 AN77
it
(0:000) (0:002) (0:001)
+0:180 AN78
it
+0:281 AN79
it
+0:412 AN80
it
(0:001) (0:001) (0:001)
+0:639 AN82
it
+0:827 AN84
it
+0:877 AN85
it
(0:002) (0:002) (0:002)
+0:893 AN86
it
+0:915 AN87
it
+5.573e-5 ZX
it
(0:003) (0:003) (6.67e-6)
 1.29e-4 ZX2
it
 1.198e-5 SX
it
+2.847e-5 SX2
it
(2.263e-5) (6.0e-7) (1.94e-6)
+6.46e-7 S2X
it
 1.713e-6 S2X2
it
(6e-8) (1.9e-7)
N = 1; 739; 996
R
2
= 0:564
 = 0:256
(38)
A.3.2 Imputed rm eects
For individual in rms with insucient data to calculate a rm eect (less
than 10 observations in the rm), we ran a single regression of equation (17),
pooling all of the data and assigning the estimated coecients to all rms in the
group. This group included 1,353,794 observations (26% of the total), although
it represented 86% of the rms. The results of the regression on this group are
presented in equation (39).
DLFRAISR
it
=  0:028 +0:003 s
it
 0:005 s
?
it
(3.375e-4) (8.476e-5) (1.772e-4)
N = 1; 353; 794
R
2
= 0:0013
(39)
A.4 Construction of the Firm-Level Data
A.4.1 Calculation of the Firm-Level Averages
We need to calculate 
j
, u
j
 and their respective variances based on the 
i
and
u
i
 estimated according to the procedure laid out in section ?? above. 
j
,
u
j
 are simply the means of 
i
and u
i
, weighted by individual-years. In other
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words,

j
=
P
i
[
i
T
ij
]
P
i
T
ij
; u
j
 =
P
i
[(u
i
)T
ij
]
P
i
T
ij
;
where T
ij
represents the number of observation for individual i for which he or
she is employed in rm j. The variances of 
j
, u
j
 are calculated as
Var (
j
) =
P
i
[Var (
i
)T
ij
]

P
i
T
ij

2
; Var (u
j
) =
P
i
[Var (u
i
)T
ij
]

P
i
T
ij

2
;
since each 
i
and u
i
 is a random variable with known variance. The variables

j
, 
1j
and 
2j
already have unique values for a given SIREN (enterprise).
Unfortunately, even having restricted estimation of rm-specic 
j
, 
1j
and 
2j
to those SIRENs for which we had 10 or more observations, we still ended up
with some outliers. Thus, in cases where either  3  
j
 3 or  2  
1j
 2
or  2  
1j
+ 
2j
 2, we set 
j
, 
1j
and 
2j
equal to the values estimated
in the pooled regression. Weighting by individual-years, this aected only 0.15
percent of the observations in our sample.
A.4.2 Firm-level Employment and Capital Stock
The variable EFFEC (eectif, in thousands of workers) measures the total full-
time employment in an enterprise as of December 31 (prior to 1984) and the
annual average full-time employment (1984 and later) as found in the BIC. We
then took its mean over all years that the rm appeared in the sample to get
MEFFEC, the mean number of employees. Total capital in the enterprise is
dened as the sum of Dettes (Debt) and Fonds propres d'entreprise (Owners'
Equity). Our capital measure is equal to Actif total (Total assets) in French
accounting systems. This information was taken directly from the BIC for every
rm-year. We used a sector-by-sector, time varying index of the cost of capital
(KAPP, 1980=100), available from the Banque de Donees Macroeconomiques
(BDM). CAPITR is dened as total capital divided by cost of capital (in millions
of 1980 FF). MCAPITR is the annual average of CAPITR over all available
years for the rm. The capital labor ratio is dened as CAPITR/EFFEC and
its annual average is MCAPITRF (thousands of 1980 FF)
A.4.3 Real Operating Income per Unit of Capital
We used the BIC to obtain the Excedent brut d'exploitation (Operating In-
come), or EBE, for each rm in each year that it appeared in the rm sample.
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The formula used to calculate the EBE is shown in equation 40.
EBE = ventes de marchandises (merchandise sold)
  achat de marchandises (merchandise purchased)
  variation de stock de marchandises
(variation in merchandise inventory)
+ ventes de biens (goods sold)
+ ventes de services (services sold)
+ production stockee (inventoried production)
+ production immobilisee (unnished production)
  achats de matieres premieres (primary materials purchased)
  variation de stocks sur matieres premieres
(variation of primary materials inventories)
  autres achats et charges externes
(other purchases and outside charges)
+ subventions d'exploitation (incentives for production)
  impo^ts, taxes et versements assimiles
(value added tax and other accrued taxes on
or credits for production)
  salaires et traitements (salaries and benets)
  charges sociales (payroll taxes)
(40)
The EBE was deated by the prix de valeur ajoutee (value added price index),
also found in the BDM, to yield EBER (thousands of 1980 FF). EBER was
divided by CAPITR (times 1,000) to yield EBERC, real operating income per
unit of capital (1980 FF). Lastly, we took the mean of EBERC over all of the
rm-years to get MEBERC, mean real operating income per unit of capital
(1980 FF).
A.4.4 Real Value Added Inclusive of Labor Costs
To calculate the valeur ajoutee reelle brute au cou^t des facteurs-(real value added
inclusive of labor costs), VABCFR, we divided the frais de personnel (employer's
compensation cost) from the BIC (thousands of FF) by the indice des prix a la
consommation (consumer price index) from the BDM to yield the employer's real
compensation cost (thousands of 1980 FF). The results was added to EBER, as
dened above in section A.4.3, to yield the VABCFR, real value added inclusive
of labor costs (thousands of 1980 FF). VABCFR was divided by EFFEC to yield
VABCFRF, real value added inclusive of factor costs per worker (1980 FF). We
took the mean of VABCFRF over all of the years that the rm appeared in the
sample to get MVABCFRF, mean real value added inclusive of labor costs per
worker (1980 FF).
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A.4.5 Employment structure
The variable MING, proportion of engineers, technicians and managers in the
work force (EFFEC), was calculated from the ESE using the PCS occupation
classication (35) for individuals in categories 30 and 40. MOQA, the proportion
of skilled workers in the work force, was calculated from the ESE using the
PCS occupation classication (35) for individuals in categories 50 and 61. Both
variables were expressed as a ratio to EFFEC and averaged over all the available
rm-years.
B Model Appendix
Tables B1 to B3 show the rst- and second-period wage equations for each of the
representative individuals as a function of the statistical parameters of equation
(1) and the parameters specied in each of the theoretical models in section 3.1.
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Table B1
Matching Model with Homogeneous Workers
Individual Wage Period 1 Wage Period 2
1 y
11
= + 
1
+ 
m
= w

y
12
= + 
1
+ 
m
+ 
m
= w

2 y
21
= + 
2
+ 
m
= w

3 y
31
= + 
3
+ 
m
+ 
m
= w

4 y
42
= + 
3
+ 
m
= w

5 y
51
= + 
5
+ 
n
= w

 
H
2
y
52
= + 
5
+ 
n
+ 
n
= w

+H
6 y
61
= + 
6
+ 
n
+ 
n
= w

+H
7 y
71
= + 
7
+ 
n
= w

 
H
2
y
72
= + 
7
+ 
m
= w

8 y
82
= + 
8
+ 
n
= w

 
H
2
9 y
92
= + 
9
+ 
n
= w

 
H
2
Notes: Individual 1 enters type m rm in period 1; individual 2 entered type m
rm in period 0 (before period 1); individual 3 entered type n rm in period 0
(before period 1), had a negative matching outcome and left for a type m rm;
individual 4 enters type m rm in period 2; individual 5 enters type n rm in
period 1, has a positive matching outcome; individual 6 entered type n rm in
period 0 (before period 1), had a positive matching outcome and remained in
type n rm for period 1; individual 7 enters type n rm, has a negative matching
outcome and leaves for a type m rm in period 2; individuals 8 and 9 enter type
n rm in period 2.
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Table B2
Rent-Splitting Model
Individual Wage Period 1 Wage Period 2
1 y
11
= + 
1
+ 
m
= x
1
  s
m
Q y
12
= + 
1
+ 
m
+ 
m
= x
1
+ s
m
Q
2 y
21
= + 
2
+ 
m
= x
2
  s
m
Q y
22
= + 
2
+ 
n
= x
2
  s
n
Q
3 y
31
= + 
3
+ 
n
= x
3
+ s
n
Q y
32
= + 
3
+ 
n
+ 
n
= x
3
  s
n
Q
4 y
41
= + 
4
+ 
n
= x
4
+ s
n
Q y
42
= + 
4
+ 
m
= x
2
+ s
n
Q
Notes: The quasi-rent is  Q in type m rm in period 1 and Q in period 2. The
quasi-rent is Q in type n rm in period 1 and  Q in period 2. Individual 1
works in type m rm in both periods. Individual 2 works in type m rm in
period 1 and in type n rm in period 2. Individual 3 works in type n rm in
both periods. Individual 4 works in type n rm in period 1 and in type m rm
in period 2.
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Table B3
Incentive Model with Heterogeneous Workers
Individual Wage Period 1 Wage Period 2
1 y
11
= + 
1
+ 
m
= w

y
12
= + 
1
+ 
m
+ 
m
= w

2 y
21
= + 
2
+ 
m
= w

y
22
= + 
2
+ 
m
+ 
m
= w

3 y
31
= + 
3
+ 
m
= w

y
32
= + 
3
+ 
m
+ 
m
= w

4 y
41
= + 
4
+ 
n
= y   q
2
4
y
42
= + 
4
+ 
n
+ 
n
= y +

2
q
2
4
+ q
4
5 y
51
= + 
5
+ 
n
= y   q
2
5
y
52
= + 
5
+ 
n
+ 
n
= y +

2
q
2
5
+ q
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6 y
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= + 
6
+ 
n
= y   q
2
6
y
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= + 
6
+ 
n
+ 
n
= y +

2
q
2
6
+ q
6
7 y
71
= + 
7
+ 
n
= y   q
2
7
y
72
= + 
7
+ 
n
+ 
n
= y +

2
q
2
7
+ q
7
8 y
81
= + 
8
+ 
n
= y   q
2
8
y
82
= + 
8
+ 
n
+ 
n
= y +

2
q
2
8
9 y
91
= + 
9
+ 
n
= y   q
2
9
y
92
= + 
9
+ 
n
+ 
n
= y +

2
q
2
9
Notes: Individuals 1, 2, 3 belong to type m rm with q
i
, i = 1; 2; 3 between 0 and
1/3, individuals 4 to 9 belong to type n rm with q
i
, i = 4 to 9 above 1=3.
Individuals 4, 5, 6, 7 pass the test and receive the bonus; individuals 8 and 9
fail.
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